man/systemd.exec.xml

@@ -402,11 +402,11 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C</programlisting>
         <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
         <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>, <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>,
         <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
-        <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelLogs=</varname>,
-        <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>,
-        <varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname>, <varname>DynamicUser=</varname> or <varname>LockPersonality=</varname>
-        are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the
-        original value of this setting. Also see <ulink
+        <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>, <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>,
+        <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>, <varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname>,
+        <varname>DynamicUser=</varname> or <varname>LockPersonality=</varname> are specified. Note that even
+        if this setting is overridden by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of
+        this setting. Also see <ulink
         url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
         Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
@@ -1321,22 +1321,6 @@ BindReadOnlyPaths=/var/lib/systemd</programlisting>
         <xi:include href="system-only.xml" xpointer="singular"/></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
 
-      <varlistentry>
-        <term><varname>ProtectKernelLogs=</varname></term>
-
-        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, access to the kernel log ring buffer will be denied. It is
-        recommended to turn this on for most services that do not need to read from or write to the kernel log ring
-        buffer. Enabling this option removes <constant>CAP_SYSLOG</constant> from the capability bounding set for this
-        unit, and installs a system call filter to block the
-        <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>
-        system call (not to be confused with the libc API
-        <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>
-        for userspace logging). The kernel exposes its log buffer to userspace via <filename>/dev/kmsg</filename> and
-        <filename>/proc/kmsg</filename>. If enabled, these are made inaccessible to all the processes in the unit.</para>
-
-        <xi:include href="system-only.xml" xpointer="singular"/></listitem>
-      </varlistentry>
-
       <varlistentry>
         <term><varname>ProtectControlGroups=</varname></term>
 
@@ -1788,8 +1772,8 @@ SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM</programlisting>
         mappings. Specifically these are the options <varname>PrivateTmp=</varname>,
         <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectSystem=</varname>, <varname>ProtectHome=</varname>,
         <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>, <varname>ProtectControlGroups=</varname>,
-        <varname>ProtectKernelLogs=</varname>, <varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname>,
-        <varname>InaccessiblePaths=</varname> and <varname>ReadWritePaths=</varname>.</para></listitem>
+        <varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname>, <varname>InaccessiblePaths=</varname> and
+        <varname>ReadWritePaths=</varname>.</para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
 
       <varlistentry>

src/analyze/analyze-security.c

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ struct security_info {
         bool protect_control_groups;
         bool protect_kernel_modules;
         bool protect_kernel_tunables;
-        bool protect_kernel_logs;
 
         char *protect_home;
         char *protect_system;
@@ -773,16 +772,6 @@ static const struct security_assessor security_assessor_table[] = {
                 .assess = assess_bool,
                 .offset = offsetof(struct security_info, protect_kernel_tunables),
         },
-        {
-                .id = "ProtectKernelLogs=",
-                .description_good = "Service cannot read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
-                .description_bad = "Service may read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
-                .url = "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html#ProtectKernelLogs=",
-                .weight = 1000,
-                .range = 1,
-                .assess = assess_bool,
-                .offset = offsetof(struct security_info, protect_kernel_logs),
-        },
         {
                 .id = "ProtectHome=",
                 .url = "https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html#ProtectHome=",
@@ -1917,7 +1906,6 @@ static int acquire_security_info(sd_bus *bus, const char *name, struct security_
                 { "ProtectHostname",         "b",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, protect_hostname)          },
                 { "ProtectKernelModules",    "b",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, protect_kernel_modules)    },
                 { "ProtectKernelTunables",   "b",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, protect_kernel_tunables)   },
-                { "ProtectKernelLogs",       "b",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, protect_kernel_logs)       },
                 { "ProtectSystem",           "s",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, protect_system)            },
                 { "RemoveIPC",               "b",       NULL,                                    offsetof(struct security_info, remove_ipc)                },
                 { "RestrictAddressFamilies", "(bas)",   property_read_restrict_address_families, 0                                                         },
@@ -1992,9 +1980,6 @@ static int acquire_security_info(sd_bus *bus, const char *name, struct security_
         if (info->protect_kernel_modules)
                 info->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_MODULE);
 
-        if (info->protect_kernel_logs)
-                info->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYSLOG);
-
         if (info->private_devices)
                 info->capability_bounding_set &= ~((UINT64_C(1) << CAP_MKNOD) |
                                                    (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_RAWIO));

src/core/dbus-execute.c

@@ -783,7 +783,6 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_exec_vtable[] = {
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateDevices", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_devices), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectKernelTunables", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_kernel_tunables), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectKernelModules", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_kernel_modules), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
-        SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectKernelLogs", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_kernel_logs), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectControlGroups", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_control_groups), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateNetwork", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_network), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateUsers", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_users), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
@@ -1275,9 +1274,6 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
         if (streq(name, "ProtectKernelModules"))
                 return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->protect_kernel_modules, message, flags, error);
 
-        if (streq(name, "ProtectKernelLogs"))
-                return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->protect_kernel_logs, message, flags, error);
-
         if (streq(name, "ProtectControlGroups"))
                 return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->protect_control_groups, message, flags, error);
 

src/core/execute.c

@@ -1396,7 +1396,6 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
                 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) ||
                 c->protect_kernel_tunables ||
                 c->protect_kernel_modules ||
-                c->protect_kernel_logs ||
                 c->private_devices ||
                 context_has_syscall_filters(c) ||
                 !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) ||
@@ -1543,19 +1542,6 @@ static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false);
 }
 
-static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
-        assert(u);
-        assert(c);
-
-        if (!c->protect_kernel_logs)
-                return 0;
-
-        if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelLogs="))
-                return 0;
-
-        return seccomp_protect_syslog();
-}
-
 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         assert(u);
         assert(c);
@@ -1872,7 +1858,6 @@ static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
             context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO ||
             context->protect_kernel_tunables ||
             context->protect_kernel_modules ||
-            context->protect_kernel_logs ||
             context->protect_control_groups)
                 return true;
 
@@ -2508,7 +2493,6 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
                         .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
                         .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
                         .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
-                        .protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs,
                         .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
                         .mount_apivfs = context->mount_apivfs,
                         .private_mounts = context->private_mounts,
@@ -3695,12 +3679,6 @@ static int exec_child(
                         return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
                 }
 
-                r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit, context);
-                if (r < 0) {
-                        *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
-                        return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m");
-                }
-
                 r = apply_private_devices(unit, context);
                 if (r < 0) {
                         *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
@@ -4340,7 +4318,6 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
                 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
                 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
-                "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n"
                 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
                 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
                 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
@@ -4361,7 +4338,6 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules),
-                prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_logs),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_users),

src/core/execute.h

@@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ struct ExecContext {
         bool private_mounts;
         bool protect_kernel_tunables;
         bool protect_kernel_modules;
-        bool protect_kernel_logs;
         bool protect_control_groups;
         ProtectSystem protect_system;
         ProtectHome protect_home;

src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4

@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ $1.PrivateTmp,                   config_parse_bool,                  0,
 $1.PrivateDevices,               config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_devices)
 $1.ProtectKernelTunables,        config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_kernel_tunables)
 $1.ProtectKernelModules,         config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_kernel_modules)
-$1.ProtectKernelLogs,            config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_kernel_logs)
 $1.ProtectControlGroups,         config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_control_groups)
 $1.NetworkNamespacePath,         config_parse_unit_path_printf,      0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.network_namespace_path)
 $1.PrivateNetwork,               config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_network)

src/core/namespace.c

@@ -109,12 +109,6 @@ static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
         { "/usr/lib/modules",    INACCESSIBLE, true  },
 };
 
-/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
-static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = {
-        { "/proc/kmsg",          INACCESSIBLE, true },
-        { "/dev/kmsg",           INACCESSIBLE, true },
-};
-
 /*
  * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
  * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
@@ -1153,9 +1147,8 @@ static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
                 n_temporary_filesystems +
                 ns_info->private_dev +
                 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
-                (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
-                (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) +
                 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
+                (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
                 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
                 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
                 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0);
@@ -1326,12 +1319,6 @@ int setup_namespace(
                                 goto finish;
                 }
 
-                if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
-                        r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_logs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
-                        if (r < 0)
-                                goto finish;
-                }
-
                 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) {
                         *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
                                 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",

src/core/namespace.h

@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ struct NamespaceInfo {
         bool protect_control_groups:1;
         bool protect_kernel_tunables:1;
         bool protect_kernel_modules:1;
-        bool protect_kernel_logs:1;
         bool mount_apivfs:1;
         bool protect_hostname:1;
 };

src/core/unit.c

@@ -4269,9 +4269,6 @@ int unit_patch_contexts(Unit *u) {
                 if (ec->protect_kernel_modules)
                         ec->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_MODULE);
 
-                if (ec->protect_kernel_logs)
-                        ec->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYSLOG);
-
                 if (ec->dynamic_user) {
                         if (!ec->user) {
                                 r = user_from_unit_name(u, &ec->user);

src/machine/machinectl.c

@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
 #include "sigbus.h"
 #include "signal-util.h"
 #include "sort-util.h"
-#include "spawn-ask-password-agent.h"
 #include "spawn-polkit-agent.h"
 #include "stdio-util.h"
 #include "string-table.h"
@@ -1723,7 +1722,6 @@ static int start_machine(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
         assert(bus);
 
         polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(arg_transport, arg_ask_password);
-        ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled(arg_transport, arg_ask_password);
 
         r = bus_wait_for_jobs_new(bus, &w);
         if (r < 0)

src/shared/bus-unit-util.c

@@ -818,8 +818,8 @@ static int bus_append_execute_property(sd_bus_message *m, const char *field, con
                        "PrivateDevices", "PrivateNetwork", "PrivateUsers", "PrivateMounts",
                        "NoNewPrivileges", "SyslogLevelPrefix", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute", "RestrictRealtime",
                        "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC", "ProtectKernelTunables", "ProtectKernelModules",
-                       "ProtectKernelLogs", "ProtectControlGroups", "MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork",
-                       "LockPersonality", "ProtectHostname", "RestrictSUIDSGID"))
+                       "ProtectControlGroups", "MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork", "LockPersonality",
+                       "ProtectHostname", "RestrictSUIDSGID"))
                 return bus_append_parse_boolean(m, field, eq);
 
         if (STR_IN_SET(field,

src/shared/seccomp-util.c

@@ -1281,38 +1281,6 @@ int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void) {
         return 0;
 }
 
-int seccomp_protect_syslog(void) {
-        uint32_t arch;
-        int r;
-
-        SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
-                _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
-
-                r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
-                if (r < 0)
-                        return r;
-
-                r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
-                                seccomp,
-                                SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
-                                SCMP_SYS(syslog),
-                                0);
-
-                if (r < 0) {
-                        log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add syslog() rule for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
-                        continue;
-                }
-
-                r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
-                if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r))
-                        return r;
-                if (r < 0)
-                        log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install syslog protection rules for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
-        }
-
-        return 0;
-}
-
 int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist) {
         uint32_t arch;
         int r;

src/shared/seccomp-util.h

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ int seccomp_parse_syscall_filter(
 int seccomp_restrict_archs(Set *archs);
 int seccomp_restrict_namespaces(unsigned long retain);
 int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void);
-int seccomp_protect_syslog(void);
 int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist);
 int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void);
 int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void);

src/shared/spawn-ask-password-agent.c

@@ -46,16 +46,3 @@ void ask_password_agent_close(void) {
         (void) wait_for_terminate(agent_pid, NULL);
         agent_pid = 0;
 }
-
-int ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled(BusTransport transport, bool ask_password) {
-
-        /* Open the ask password agent as a child process if necessary */
-
-        if (transport != BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL)
-                return 0;
-
-        if (!ask_password)
-                return 0;
-
-        return ask_password_agent_open();
-}

src/shared/spawn-ask-password-agent.h

@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
 #pragma once
 
-#include <stdbool.h>
-
-#include "bus-util.h"
-
 int ask_password_agent_open(void);
 void ask_password_agent_close(void);
-
-int ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled(BusTransport transport, bool ask_password);

src/shared/spawn-polkit-agent.c

@@ -83,16 +83,3 @@ void polkit_agent_close(void) {
 }
 
 #endif
-
-int polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(BusTransport transport, bool ask_password) {
-
-        /* Open the polkit agent as a child process if necessary */
-
-        if (transport != BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL)
-                return 0;
-
-        if (!ask_password)
-                return 0;
-
-        return polkit_agent_open();
-}

src/shared/spawn-polkit-agent.h

@@ -1,11 +1,22 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
 #pragma once
 
-#include <stdbool.h>
-
 #include "bus-util.h"
 
 int polkit_agent_open(void);
 void polkit_agent_close(void);
 
-int polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(BusTransport transport, bool ask_password);
+static inline int polkit_agent_open_if_enabled(
+                BusTransport transport,
+                bool ask_password) {
+
+        /* Open the polkit agent as a child process if necessary */
+
+        if (transport != BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (!ask_password)
+                return 0;
+
+        return polkit_agent_open();
+}

src/systemctl/systemctl.c

@@ -236,16 +236,22 @@ static void release_busses(void) {
                 buses[w] = sd_bus_flush_close_unref(buses[w]);
 }
 
-static void ask_password_agent_open_maybe(void) {
+static void ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled(void) {
         /* Open the password agent as a child process if necessary */
 
         if (arg_dry_run)
                 return;
 
+        if (!arg_ask_password)
+                return;
+
         if (arg_scope != UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM)
                 return;
 
-        ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled(arg_transport, arg_ask_password);
+        if (arg_transport != BUS_TRANSPORT_LOCAL)
+                return;
+
+        ask_password_agent_open();
 }
 
 static void polkit_agent_open_maybe(void) {
@@ -3065,7 +3071,7 @@ static int start_unit(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-        ask_password_agent_open_maybe();
+        ask_password_agent_open_if_enabled();
         polkit_agent_open_maybe();
 
         if (arg_action == ACTION_SYSTEMCTL) {

src/test/test-namespace.c

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
 
-#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 
@@ -10,9 +9,7 @@
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
 #include "tests.h"
-#include "user-util.h"
 #include "util.h"
-#include "virt.h"
 
 static void test_tmpdir(const char *id, const char *A, const char *B) {
         _cleanup_free_ char *a, *b;
@@ -51,16 +48,14 @@ static void test_tmpdir(const char *id, const char *A, const char *B) {
         assert_se(rmdir(b) >= 0);
 }
 
-static void test_netns(void) {
+static int test_netns(void) {
         _cleanup_close_pair_ int s[2] = { -1, -1 };
         pid_t pid1, pid2, pid3;
         int r, n = 0;
         siginfo_t si;
 
-        if (geteuid() > 0) {
-                (void) log_tests_skipped("not root");
-                return;
-        }
+        if (geteuid() > 0)
+                return log_tests_skipped("not root");
 
         assert_se(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, s) >= 0);
 
@@ -107,62 +102,7 @@ static void test_netns(void) {
         n += si.si_status;
 
         assert_se(n == 1);
-}
-
-static void test_protect_kernel_logs(void) {
-        int r;
-        pid_t pid;
-        static const NamespaceInfo ns_info = {
-                .protect_kernel_logs = true,
-        };
-
-        if (geteuid() > 0) {
-                (void) log_tests_skipped("not root");
-                return;
-        }
-
-        /* In a container we likely don't have access to /dev/kmsg */
-        if (detect_container() > 0) {
-                (void) log_tests_skipped("in container");
-                return;
-        }
-
-
-        pid = fork();
-        assert_se(pid >= 0);
-
-        if (pid == 0) {
-                _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
-
-                fd = open("/dev/kmsg", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-                assert_se(fd > 0);
-
-                r = setup_namespace(NULL,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    &ns_info,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    NULL, 0,
-                                    NULL, 0,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    NULL,
-                                    PROTECT_HOME_NO,
-                                    PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO,
-                                    0,
-                                    0,
-                                    NULL);
-                assert_se(r == 0);
-
-                assert_se(setresuid(UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY, UID_NOBODY) >= 0);
-                assert_se(open("/dev/kmsg", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC) < 0);
-                assert_se(errno == EACCES);
-
-                _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
-        }
-
-        assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("ns-kernellogs", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+        return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 }
 
 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
@@ -193,8 +133,5 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
         test_tmpdir("sys-devices-pci0000:00-0000:00:1a.0-usb3-3\\x2d1-3\\x2d1:1.0-bluetooth-hci0.device", z, zz);
 
-        test_netns();
-        test_protect_kernel_logs();
-
-        return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+        return test_netns();
 }

src/test/test-seccomp.c

@@ -323,48 +323,6 @@ static void test_protect_sysctl(void) {
         assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("sysctlseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
 }
 
-static void test_protect_syslog(void) {
-        pid_t pid;
-
-        log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
-
-        if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
-                log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
-                return;
-        }
-        if (geteuid() != 0) {
-                log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
-                return;
-        }
-
-        /* in containers syslog() is likely missing anyway */
-        if (detect_container() > 0) {
-                log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__);
-                return;
-        }
-
-        pid = fork();
-        assert_se(pid >= 0);
-
-        if (pid == 0) {
-#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0
-                assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, -1, NULL, 0) < 0);
-                assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
-#endif
-
-                assert_se(seccomp_protect_syslog() >= 0);
-
-#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0
-                assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
-                assert_se(errno == EPERM);
-#endif
-
-                _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
-        }
-
-        assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("syslogseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
-}
-
 static void test_restrict_address_families(void) {
         pid_t pid;
 
@@ -1025,7 +983,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         test_filter_sets_ordered();
         test_restrict_namespace();
         test_protect_sysctl();
-        test_protect_syslog();
         test_restrict_address_families();
         test_restrict_realtime();
         test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap();

test/meson.build

@@ -109,8 +109,6 @@ test_data_files = '''
         test-execute/exec-privatetmp-no.service
         test-execute/exec-privatetmp-yes.service
         test-execute/exec-protecthome-tmpfs-vs-protectsystem-strict.service
-        test-execute/exec-protectkernellogs-yes-capabilities.service
-        test-execute/exec-protectkernellogs-no-capabilities.service
         test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service
         test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service
         test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service

test/test-execute/exec-protectkernellogs-no-capabilities.service

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Test CAP_SYSLOG for ProtectKernelLogs=no
-
-[Service]
-ProtectKernelLogs=no
-ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'capsh --print | grep cap_syslog'
-Type=oneshot

test/test-execute/exec-protectkernellogs-yes-capabilities.service

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Test CAP_SYSLOG for ProtectKernelLogs=yes
-
-[Service]
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
-ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c '! capsh --print | grep cap_syslog'
-Type=oneshot

units/systemd-coredump@.service.in

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
 RestrictNamespaces=yes

units/systemd-hostnamed.service.in

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ ProtectControlGroups=yes
 ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 ReadWritePaths=/etc
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX

units/systemd-journal-gatewayd.service.in

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
 RestrictNamespaces=yes
 RestrictRealtime=yes

units/systemd-journal-remote.service.in

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
 RestrictNamespaces=yes

units/systemd-journal-upload.service.in

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
 RestrictNamespaces=yes
 RestrictRealtime=yes

units/systemd-localed.service.in

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 ReadWritePaths=/etc
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX

units/systemd-logind.service.in

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ ProtectControlGroups=yes
 ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 ReadWritePaths=/etc /run
 Restart=always

units/systemd-machined.service.in

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ LockPersonality=yes
 MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
 NoNewPrivileges=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_INET AF_INET6
 RestrictRealtime=yes
 SystemCallArchitectures=native

units/systemd-networkd.service.in

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ NoNewPrivileges=yes
 ProtectControlGroups=yes
 ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 Restart=on-failure
 RestartSec=0

units/systemd-portabled.service.in

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ BusName=org.freedesktop.portable1
 CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_KILL CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_FSETID CAP_MKNOD
 MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 RestrictRealtime=yes
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_INET AF_INET6
 SystemCallFilter=@system-service @mount

units/systemd-resolved.service.in

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ ProtectControlGroups=yes
 ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=0

units/systemd-timedated.service.in

@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 ReadWritePaths=/etc
 RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX

units/systemd-timesyncd.service.in

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ ProtectHome=yes
 ProtectHostname=yes
 ProtectKernelModules=yes
 ProtectKernelTunables=yes
-ProtectKernelLogs=yes
 ProtectSystem=strict
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=0