Merge 6e06b80854 into bbec1c87d3

Continuation of 4ebbb5bfe8.
Closes #35307.

man/daemon.xml

@@ -684,6 +684,15 @@ fi</programlisting>
     <citerefentry><refentrytitle>file-hierarchy</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>.</para>
   </refsect1>
 
+  <refsect1>
+    <title>Notes</title>
+
+    <para>
+       All example codes in this page are licensed under <literal>MIT No Attribution</literal>
+      (SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0).
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+
   <refsect1>
     <title>See Also</title>
     <para><simplelist type="inline">

man/importctl.xml

@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@
 
         <para>If <option>-keep-download=yes</option> is specified the image will be downloaded and stored in
         a read-only subvolume/directory in the image directory that is named after the specified URL and its
-        HTTP etag. A writable snapshot is then taken from this subvolume, and named after the specified local
+        HTTP etag (see <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_ETag">HTTP ETag</ulink> for more
+        information). A writable snapshot is then taken from this subvolume, and named after the specified local
         name. This behavior ensures that creating multiple instances of the same URL is efficient, as
         multiple downloads are not necessary. In order to create only the read-only image, and avoid creating
         its writable snapshot, specify <literal>-</literal> as local name.</para>

man/pam_systemd_loadkey.xml

@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
     <title>Description</title>
 
     <para><command>pam_systemd_loadkey</command> reads a NUL-separated password list from the kernel keyring,
-    and sets the last password in the list as the PAM authtok.</para>
+    and sets the last password in the list as the PAM authtok, which can be used by e.g.
+    <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>pam_get_authtok</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
+    </para>
 
     <para>The password list is supposed to be stored in the "user" keyring of the root user,
     by an earlier call to

man/run0.xml

@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@
     <literal>systemd-run0</literal> PAM stack.</para>
 
     <para>Note that <command>run0</command> is implemented as an alternative multi-call invocation of
-    <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-run</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>.</para>
+    <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-run</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>. That is,
+    <command>run0</command> is a symbolic link to <command>systemd-run</command> executable file, and it
+    behaves as <command>run0</command> if it is invoked through the symbolic link, otherwise behaves as
+    <command>systemd-run</command>.</para>
   </refsect1>
 
   <refsect1>

man/systemd-rfkill.service.xml

@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@
   <refsect1>
     <title>Kernel Command Line</title>
 
-    <para><filename>systemd-rfkill</filename> understands the
+    <para>
-    following kernel command line parameter:</para>
+      <command>systemd-rfkill</command> understands the following kernel command line parameter. See also
+      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>kernel-command-line</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
+    </para>
 
     <variablelist class='kernel-commandline-options'>
       <varlistentry>

man/systemd-system.conf.xml

@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@
         and running in an initrd equivalent to true, otherwise false. This implements a restricted subset of
         the per-unit setting of the same name, see
         <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.exec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry> for
-        details: currently, the <literal>full</literal> or <literal>struct</literal> values are not
+        details: currently, the <literal>full</literal> or <literal>strict</literal> values are not
         supported.</para>
 
         <xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v256"/></listitem>

man/ukify.xml

@@ -394,9 +394,9 @@
           <listitem><para>SBAT metadata associated with the UKI or addon. SBAT policies are useful to revoke
           whole groups of UKIs or addons with a single, static policy update that does not take space in
           DBX/MOKX. If not specified manually, a default metadata entry consisting of
-          <literal>uki,1,UKI,uki,1,https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/</literal>
+          <programlisting>uki,1,UKI,uki,1,https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/</programlisting>
           for UKIs and
-          <literal>uki-addon,1,UKI Addon,addon,1,https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-stub.html</literal>
+          <programlisting>uki-addon,1,UKI Addon,addon,1,https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-stub.html</programlisting>
           for addons will be used, to ensure it is always possible to revoke them. For more information on
           SBAT see <ulink url="https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md">Shim documentation</ulink>.
           </para>

src/basic/fileio.c

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int write_string_file_full(
                 const char *fn,
                 const char *line,
                 WriteStringFileFlags flags,
-                const struct timespec *ts) {
+                const struct timespec *ts,
+                const char *label_fn) {
 
         bool call_label_ops_post = false, made_file = false;
         _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
@@ -321,7 +322,8 @@ int write_string_file_full(
         mode_t mode = write_string_file_flags_to_mode(flags);
 
         if (FLAGS_SET(flags, WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL|WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE)) {
-                r = label_ops_pre(dir_fd, fn, mode);
+                const char *lookup = label_fn ? label_fn : fn;
+                r = label_ops_pre(dir_fd, lookup, mode);
                 if (r < 0)
                         goto fail;
 

src/basic/fileio.h

@@ -51,12 +51,13 @@ int write_string_stream_full(FILE *f, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags fla
 static inline int write_string_stream(FILE *f, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
         return write_string_stream_full(f, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
 }
-int write_string_file_full(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const struct timespec *ts);
+
+int write_string_file_full(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const struct timespec *ts, const char *label_fn);
 static inline int write_string_file(const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
-        return write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
+        return write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL, /*label_fn=*/ NULL);
 }
 static inline int write_string_file_at(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
-        return write_string_file_full(dir_fd, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
+        return write_string_file_full(dir_fd, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL, /*label_fn=*/ NULL);
 }
 int write_string_filef(const char *fn, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const char *format, ...) _printf_(3, 4);
 

src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pkcs11.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include "fileio.h"
 #include "format-util.h"
 #include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "iovec-util.h"
 #include "macro.h"
 #include "memory-util.h"
 #include "parse-util.h"
@@ -31,8 +32,7 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
                 const char *key_file,         /* We either expect key_file and associated parameters to be set (for file keys) … */
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,         /* … or key_data and key_data_size (for literal keys) */
+                const struct iovec *key_data, /* … or literal keys via key_data */
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
                 void **ret_decrypted_key,
@@ -47,15 +47,15 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
 
         assert(friendly_name);
         assert(pkcs11_uri);
-        assert(key_file || key_data);
+        assert(key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data));
         assert(ret_decrypted_key);
         assert(ret_decrypted_key_size);
 
         /* The functions called here log about all errors, except for EAGAIN which means "token not found right now" */
 
-        if (key_data) {
+        if (iovec_is_set(key_data)) {
-                data.encrypted_key = (void*) key_data;
+                data.encrypted_key = (void*) key_data->iov_base;
-                data.encrypted_key_size = key_data_size;
+                data.encrypted_key_size = key_data->iov_len;
 
                 data.free_encrypted_key = false;
         } else {

src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-pkcs11.h

@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
                 const char *key_file,
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
                 void **ret_decrypted_key,
@@ -39,8 +38,7 @@ static inline int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
                 const char *key_file,
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
                 void **ret_decrypted_key,

src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c

@@ -1471,8 +1471,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
                 struct crypt_device *cd,
                 const char *name,
                 const char *key_file,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 uint32_t flags,
                 bool pass_volume_key) {
@@ -1489,7 +1488,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
         assert(name);
         assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto);
 
-        if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !key_data)
+        if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
                 return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
                                         "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing.");
 
@@ -1513,7 +1512,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
                                                 arg_fido2_rp_id,
                                                 arg_fido2_cid, arg_fido2_cid_size,
                                                 key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
-                                                key_data, key_data_size,
+                                                key_data,
                                                 until,
                                                 arg_fido2_manual_flags,
                                                 "cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
@@ -1623,8 +1622,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
                 struct crypt_device *cd,
                 const char *name,
                 const char *key_file,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 uint32_t flags,
                 bool pass_volume_key) {
@@ -1635,6 +1633,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
         _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
         _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
         _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL;
+        struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
         int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
         const char *uri = NULL;
         bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();
@@ -1653,13 +1652,13 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
                                 return r;
 
                         uri = discovered_uri;
-                        key_data = discovered_key;
+                        discovered_key_data = IOVEC_MAKE(discovered_key, discovered_key_size);
-                        key_data_size = discovered_key_size;
+                        key_data = &discovered_key_data;
                 }
         } else {
                 uri = arg_pkcs11_uri;
 
-                if (!key_file && !key_data)
+                if (!key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
         }
 
@@ -1682,7 +1681,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
                                         friendly,
                                         uri,
                                         key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
-                                        key_data, key_data_size,
+                                        key_data,
                                         until,
                                         arg_ask_password_flags,
                                         &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
@@ -2231,9 +2230,9 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
         if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2)
                 return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
         if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2)
-                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
         if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11)
-                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
         if (key_data)
                 return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, flags, pass_volume_key);
         if (key_file)

src/libsystemd/sd-varlink/sd-varlink.c

@@ -1698,7 +1698,8 @@ _public_ int sd_varlink_get_events(sd_varlink *v) {
                 ret |= EPOLLIN;
 
         if (!v->write_disconnected &&
-            v->output_buffer_size > 0)
+            (v->output_queue ||
+             v->output_buffer_size > 0))
                 ret |= EPOLLOUT;
 
         return ret;

src/shared/cryptsetup-fido2.c

@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
                 const char *key_file,
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 Fido2EnrollFlags required,
                 const char *askpw_credential,
@@ -45,10 +44,10 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
                                         "Local verification is required to unlock this volume, but the 'headless' parameter was set.");
 
         assert(cid);
-        assert(key_file || key_data);
+        assert(key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data));
 
-        if (key_data)
+        if (iovec_is_set(key_data))
-                salt = IOVEC_MAKE(key_data, key_data_size);
+                salt = *key_data;
         else {
                 if (key_file_size > 0)
                         log_debug("Ignoring 'keyfile-size=' option for a FIDO2 salt file.");
@@ -252,7 +251,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key_auto(
                                 /* key_file= */ NULL, /* salt is read from LUKS header instead of key_file */
                                 /* key_file_size= */ 0,
                                 /* key_file_offset= */ 0,
-                                salt, salt_size,
+                                &IOVEC_MAKE(salt, salt_size),
                                 until,
                                 required,
                                 "cryptsetup.fido2-pin",

src/shared/cryptsetup-fido2.h

@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
                 const char *key_file,
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 Fido2EnrollFlags required,
                 const char *askpw_credential,
@@ -52,8 +51,7 @@ static inline int acquire_fido2_key(
                 const char *key_file,
                 size_t key_file_size,
                 uint64_t key_file_offset,
-                const void *key_data,
+                const struct iovec *key_data,
-                size_t key_data_size,
                 usec_t until,
                 Fido2EnrollFlags required,
                 const char *askpw_credential,

src/sysext/sysext.c

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
 
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <getopt.h>
 #include <linux/loop.h>
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@
 #include "process-util.h"
 #include "rm-rf.h"
 #include "sort-util.h"
+#include "selinux-util.h"
 #include "string-table.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
 #include "terminal-util.h"
@@ -899,6 +901,7 @@ static int resolve_mutable_directory(
         _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *resolved_path = NULL, *dir_name = NULL;
         const char *root = arg_root, *base = MUTABLE_EXTENSIONS_BASE_DIR;
         int r;
+        _cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
 
         assert(hierarchy);
         assert(ret_resolved_mutable_directory);
@@ -943,6 +946,14 @@ static int resolve_mutable_directory(
                 r = mkdir_p(path_in_root, 0700);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create a directory '%s': %m", path_in_root);
+
+                atfd = open(path_in_root, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
+                if (atfd < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", path_in_root);
+
+                r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, hierarchy, 0);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", path_in_root);
         }
 
         r = chase(path, root, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT, &resolved_path, NULL);
@@ -1289,6 +1300,7 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
 
         int r;
         const char *top_layer = NULL;
+        _cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
 
         assert(op);
         assert(overlay_path);
@@ -1301,10 +1313,28 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make directory '%s': %m", meta_path);
 
+        atfd = open(meta_path, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
+        if (atfd < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", meta_path);
+
+        r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, op->hierarchy, 0);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", meta_path);
+
         if (op->upper_dir && op->work_dir) {
                 r = mkdir_p(op->work_dir, 0700);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make directory '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
+                _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF;
+
+                dfd = open(op->work_dir, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
+                if (dfd < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
+
+                r = mac_selinux_fix_full(dfd, NULL, op->hierarchy, 0);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
+
                 top_layer = op->upper_dir;
         } else {
                 assert(!strv_isempty(op->lower_dirs));
@@ -1325,7 +1355,7 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, const char *meta_path) {
+static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, const char *meta_path, const char *hierarchy) {
         _cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL, *buf = NULL;
         int r;
 
@@ -1343,14 +1373,15 @@ static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, cons
         if (!buf)
                 return log_oom();
 
-        r = write_string_file(f, buf, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_MKDIR_0755);
+        const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, image_class_info[image_class].short_identifier_plural);
+        r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD,f, buf, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_MKDIR_0755|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write extension meta file '%s': %m", f);
 
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *overlay_path) {
+static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *overlay_path, const char *hierarchy) {
         _cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL;
         struct stat st;
         int r;
@@ -1372,14 +1403,15 @@ static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const c
         /* Modifying the underlying layers while the overlayfs is mounted is technically undefined, but at
          * least it won't crash or deadlock, as per the kernel docs about overlayfs:
          * https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/filesystems/overlayfs.html#changes-to-underlying-filesystems */
-        r = write_string_file(f, FORMAT_DEVNUM(st.st_dev), WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE);
+        const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, image_class_info[image_class].short_identifier_plural);
+        r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, f, FORMAT_DEVNUM(st.st_dev), WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write '%s': %m", f);
 
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *work_dir) {
+static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *work_dir, const char* hierarchy) {
         _cleanup_free_ char *escaped_work_dir_in_root = NULL, *f = NULL;
         char *work_dir_in_root = NULL;
         int r;
@@ -1406,7 +1438,8 @@ static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, co
         escaped_work_dir_in_root = cescape(work_dir_in_root);
         if (!escaped_work_dir_in_root)
                 return log_oom();
-        r = write_string_file(f, escaped_work_dir_in_root, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE);
+        const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, "work_dir");
+        r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, f, escaped_work_dir_in_root, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write '%s': %m", f);
 
@@ -1418,8 +1451,10 @@ static int store_info_in_meta(
                 char **extensions,
                 const char *meta_path,
                 const char *overlay_path,
-                const char *work_dir) {
+                const char *work_dir,
-
+                const char *hierarchy) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL;
+        _cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
         int r;
 
         assert(extensions);
@@ -1427,15 +1462,32 @@ static int store_info_in_meta(
         assert(overlay_path);
         /* work_dir may be NULL */
 
-        r = write_extensions_file(image_class, extensions, meta_path);
+        f = path_join(meta_path, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name);
+        if (!f)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        r = mkdir_p(f, 0755);
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-        r = write_dev_file(image_class, meta_path, overlay_path);
+        atfd = open(f, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
+        if (atfd < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", f);
+
+        r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, hierarchy, 0);
+
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", hierarchy);
+
+        r = write_extensions_file(image_class, extensions, meta_path, hierarchy);
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-        r = write_work_dir_file(image_class, meta_path, work_dir);
+        r = write_dev_file(image_class, meta_path, overlay_path, hierarchy);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        r = write_work_dir_file(image_class, meta_path, work_dir, hierarchy);
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
@@ -1501,6 +1553,8 @@ static int merge_hierarchy(
         assert(overlay_path);
         assert(workspace_path);
 
+        mac_selinux_init();
+
         r = determine_used_extensions(hierarchy, paths, &used_paths, &extensions_used);
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
@@ -1528,7 +1582,7 @@ static int merge_hierarchy(
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 
-        r = store_info_in_meta(image_class, extensions, meta_path, overlay_path, op->work_dir);
+        r = store_info_in_meta(image_class, extensions, meta_path, overlay_path, op->work_dir, op->hierarchy);
         if (r < 0)
                 return r;
 

src/sysupdate/updatectl.c

@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ static int verb_enable(int argc, char **argv, void *userdata) {
                                        "SetFeatureEnabled",
                                        &error,
                                        /* reply= */ NULL,
-                                       "sbt",
+                                       "sit",
                                        *feature,
                                        (int) enable,
                                        UINT64_C(0));

src/test/test-audit-util.c

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 #include "audit-util.h"
 #include "tests.h"
+#include "virt.h"
 
 TEST(audit_loginuid_from_pid) {
         _cleanup_(pidref_done) PidRef self = PIDREF_NULL, pid1 = PIDREF_NULL;
@@ -17,7 +18,22 @@ TEST(audit_loginuid_from_pid) {
         if (r >= 0)
                 log_info("self audit login uid: " UID_FMT, uid);
 
-        ASSERT_ERROR(audit_loginuid_from_pid(&pid1, &uid), ENODATA);
+        /* pid1 at build time does not necessarily have to be systemd, it could be anything and be in any
+         * state outside of our control, as any custom-built, unknown and weird container manager stub pid1
+         * might be in use. The audit helper should catch this on container-other and return -ENODATA
+         * already, but we cannot have any coverage of this case, so a risk of regression is always present.
+         * To be on the safe side, assert only on known container solutions (or VMs/bare-metal), and print a
+         * loud warning and complain, asking to fix the audit setup of the container manager, if it is an
+         * unknown one. As a specific example, on the Debian buildd network the stub pid1 is not systemd,
+         * and has a sessionid. */
+        r = audit_loginuid_from_pid(&pid1, &uid);
+        if (detect_container() != VIRTUALIZATION_CONTAINER_OTHER)
+                ASSERT_ERROR(r, ENODATA);
+        else if (r != -ENODATA)
+                log_error("audit_loginuid_from_pid on pid1 unexpectedly returned %d instead of -ENODATA. "
+                          "This likely suggests that the container manager under which this test is run "
+                          "has incorrectly set up the audit subsystem, as the stub pid1 is not supposed to "
+                          "have an audit login id, and it should be fixed.", r);
 
         uint32_t sessionid;
         r = audit_session_from_pid(&self, &sessionid);
@@ -26,7 +42,15 @@ TEST(audit_loginuid_from_pid) {
         if (r >= 0)
                 log_info("self audit session id: %" PRIu32, sessionid);
 
-        ASSERT_ERROR(audit_session_from_pid(&pid1, &sessionid), ENODATA);
+        /* As above. */
+        r = audit_session_from_pid(&pid1, &sessionid);
+        if (detect_container() != VIRTUALIZATION_CONTAINER_OTHER)
+                ASSERT_ERROR(r, ENODATA);
+        else if (r != -ENODATA)
+                log_error("audit_session_from_pid on pid1 unexpectedly returned %d instead of -ENODATA. "
+                          "This likely suggests that the container manager under which this test is run "
+                          "has incorrectly set up the audit subsystem, as the stub pid1 is not supposed to "
+                          "have an audit session id, and it should be fixed.", r);
 }
 
 static int intro(void) {

src/update-done/update-done.c

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static int apply_timestamp(const char *path, struct timespec *ts) {
                      timespec_load_nsec(ts)) < 0)
                 return log_oom();
 
-        r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, path, message, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, ts);
+        r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, path, message, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, ts, NULL);
         if (r == -EROFS)
                 log_debug_errno(r, "Cannot create \"%s\", file system is read-only.", path);
         else if (r < 0)

test/units/TEST-13-NSPAWN.machined.sh

@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ trap at_exit EXIT
 
 systemctl service-log-level systemd-machined debug
 systemctl service-log-level systemd-importd debug
+# per request in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/35117
+systemctl edit --runtime --stdin 'systemd-nspawn@.service' --drop-in=debug.conf <<EOF
+[Service]
+Environment=SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug
+EOF
 
 # Mount temporary directory over /var/lib/machines to not pollute the image
 mkdir -p /var/lib/machines
@@ -278,13 +283,13 @@ varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.List
 # sending TRAP signal
 rm -f /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap
 varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.Kill '{"name":"long-running", "whom": "leader", "signal": 5}'
-timeout 30 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap; do sleep .5; done"
+timeout 120 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap; do sleep .5; done"
 
 # test io.systemd.Machine.Terminate
 long_running_machine_start
 rm -f /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate
 varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.Terminate '{"name":"long-running"}'
-timeout 10 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate; do sleep .5; done"
+timeout 30 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate; do sleep .5; done"
 timeout 30 bash -c "while varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.List '{\"name\":\"long-running\"}'; do sleep 0.5; done"
 
 # test io.systemd.Machine.Register
@@ -356,7 +361,7 @@ journalctl --sync
 machinectl terminate container-without-os-release
 machinectl terminate long-running
 # wait for the container being stopped, otherwise acquiring image metadata by io.systemd.MachineImage.List may fail in the below.
-timeout 10 bash -c "while machinectl status long-running &>/dev/null; do sleep .5; done"
+timeout 30 bash -c "while machinectl status long-running &>/dev/null; do sleep .5; done"
 systemctl kill --signal=KILL systemd-nspawn@long-running.service || :
 
 (ip addr show lo | grep -q 192.168.1.100) || ip address add 192.168.1.100/24 dev lo