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No commits in common. "db4b6b70434295aa7799ac74b80a6d708d1f0ba4" and "a9859a62f1af8bcd21bd7d7f3840d363e033bea2" have entirely different histories.

8 changed files with 12 additions and 35 deletions

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@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ Packages=
iproute
iputils
knot
libucontext
linux
man-db
multipath-tools

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@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ Packages=
kernel-core
knot
libcap-ng-utils
libucontext
man-db
nmap-ncat
openssh-clients

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@ -10,4 +10,3 @@ Packages=
diffutils
erofs-utils
git
libucontext

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@ -12,6 +12,5 @@ Packages=
git-core
libasan
libubsan
libucontext-devel
rpm-build
which

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@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ Packages=
clang-tools-extra
github-cli
lcov
libucontext
mypy
pkgconf
ruff

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@ -12,5 +12,4 @@ Packages=
rpm-build
libasan
libubsan
libucontext-devel
compiler-rt

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@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int handle_generic_user_record_error(
assert(secret);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_TEXT_INFO, NULL, _("Please authenticate physically on security token of user %s."), user_name);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Please authenticate physically on security token of user %s."), user_name);
r = user_record_set_pkcs11_protected_authentication_path_permitted(secret, true);
if (r < 0)
@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int handle_generic_user_record_error(
assert(secret);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_TEXT_INFO, NULL, _("Please confirm presence on security token of user %s."), user_name);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Please confirm presence on security token of user %s."), user_name);
r = user_record_set_fido2_user_presence_permitted(secret, true);
if (r < 0)
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static int handle_generic_user_record_error(
assert(secret);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_TEXT_INFO, NULL, _("Please verify user on security token of user %s."), user_name);
(void) pam_prompt_graceful(pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("Please verify user on security token of user %s."), user_name);
r = user_record_set_fido2_user_verification_permitted(secret, true);
if (r < 0)

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@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "async.h"
#include "dirent-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "fdset.h"
#include "log.h"
@ -180,10 +179,9 @@ int fdset_new_fill(
d = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
if (!d) {
if (errno == ENOENT && proc_mounted() == 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOSYS),
"Failed to open /proc/self/fd/, /proc/ is not mounted.");
return -ENOSYS;
return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/fd/: %m ");
return -errno;
}
s = fdset_new();
@ -212,14 +210,9 @@ int fdset_new_fill(
* been passed in can be collected and fds which have been created locally can be
* ignored, under the assumption that only the latter have O_CLOEXEC set. */
fl = RET_NERRNO(fcntl(fd, F_GETFD));
if (fl < 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
(void) fd_get_path(fd, &path);
return log_debug_errno(fl,
"Failed to get flag of fd=%d (%s): %m ",
fd, strna(path));
}
fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
if (fl < 0)
return -errno;
if (FLAGS_SET(fl, FD_CLOEXEC) != !!filter_cloexec)
continue;
@ -228,23 +221,13 @@ int fdset_new_fill(
/* We need to set CLOEXEC manually only if we're collecting non-CLOEXEC fds. */
if (filter_cloexec <= 0) {
r = fd_cloexec(fd, true);
if (r < 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
(void) fd_get_path(fd, &path);
return log_debug_errno(r,
"Failed to set CLOEXEC flag fd=%d (%s): %m ",
fd, strna(path));
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
r = fdset_put(s, fd);
if (r < 0) {
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL;
(void) fd_get_path(fd, &path);
return log_debug_errno(r,
"Failed to put fd=%d (%s) into fdset: %m ",
fd, strna(path));
}
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
*ret = TAKE_PTR(s);