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No commits in common. "d2841d563eadf7ab318cf2ecdabfb03d39977fb3" and "5e258d734ad02c2aa7888e3fcf047442d6b0f0f0" have entirely different histories.

18 changed files with 144 additions and 336 deletions

23
TODO
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@ -20,24 +20,12 @@ Janitorial Clean-ups:
Features:
* add wrapper for mount() that uses O_PATH on the destination and than mounts
to /proc/self/fd/xxx so that we basically have a mount() with O_NOFOLLOW like
behaviour. (in case of bind mounts do it on both source and target)
* add root=tmpfs that mounts a tmpfs to /sysroot (to be used in combination
with usr=…, for a similar effect as systemd.volatile=yes but without the
"hide-out" effect). Also, add root=gpt-auto-late support or so, that is like
root=gpt-auto but initially mounts a tmpfs to /sysroot, and then revisits
later after systemd-repart ran. Usecase: let's ship images with only /usr
partition, then on first boot create the root partition. In this case we want
to read the repart data from /usr before the root partition exists. Add
usr=gpt-auto that automatically finds a /usr partition.
* homed: keep an fd to the homedir open at all times, to keep the fs pinned
(autofs and such) while user is loged in.
* nss-systemd: also synthesize shadow records for users/groups
* nspawn: move "incoming mount" directory to /run/host, move "inaccessible"
nodes to /run/host, move notify socket (for sd_notify() between payload and
container manager)
* make use of new glibc 2.32 APIs sigabbrev_np() and strerrorname_np().
* cryptsetup: if keyfile specified in crypttab is AF_UNIX socket, connect to it
@ -77,6 +65,9 @@ Features:
often for one, let's turn it off entirely for a while. Use that for the
/proc/self/mountinfo logic.
* move our systemd-user PAM snippet to /usr/, which PAM appears to support
these days
* nspawn: support time namespaces
* systemd-firstboot: make sure to always use chase_symlinks() before

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@ -1370,18 +1370,15 @@
<listitem><para>Configures how to set up standard input, output and error output for the container
payload, as well as the <filename>/dev/console</filename> device for the container. Takes one of
<option>interactive</option>, <option>read-only</option>, <option>passive</option>,
<option>pipe</option> or <option>autopipe</option>. If <option>interactive</option>, a pseudo-TTY is
allocated and made available as <filename>/dev/console</filename> in the container. It is then
bi-directionally connected to the standard input and output passed to
<command>systemd-nspawn</command>. <option>read-only</option> is similar but only the output of the
container is propagated and no input from the caller is read. If <option>passive</option>, a pseudo
TTY is allocated, but it is not connected anywhere. In <option>pipe</option> mode no pseudo TTY is
allocated, but the standard input, output and error output file descriptors passed to
<command>systemd-nspawn</command> are passed on — as they are — to the container payload, see the
following paragraph. Finally, <option>autopipe</option> mode operates like
<option>interactive</option> when <command>systemd-nspawn</command> is invoked on a terminal, and
like <option>pipe</option> otherwise. Defaults to <option>interactive</option> if
<option>interactive</option>, <option>read-only</option>, <option>passive</option>, or
<option>pipe</option>. If <option>interactive</option>, a pseudo-TTY is allocated and made available
as <filename>/dev/console</filename> in the container. It is then bi-directionally connected to the
standard input and output passed to <command>systemd-nspawn</command>. <option>read-only</option> is
similar but only the output of the container is propagated and no input from the caller is read. If
<option>passive</option>, a pseudo TTY is allocated, but it is not connected anywhere. Finally, in
<option>pipe</option> mode no pseudo TTY is allocated, but the standard input, output and error
output file descriptors passed to <command>systemd-nspawn</command> are passed on — as they are — to
the container payload, see the following paragraph. Defaults to <option>interactive</option> if
<command>systemd-nspawn</command> is invoked from a terminal, and <option>read-only</option>
otherwise.</para>

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@ -882,17 +882,6 @@ libm = cc.find_library('m')
libdl = cc.find_library('dl')
libcrypt = cc.find_library('crypt')
crypt_header = conf.get('HAVE_CRYPT_H') == 1 ? \
'''#include <crypt.h>''' : '''#include <unistd.h>'''
foreach ident : [
['crypt_ra', crypt_header],
['crypt_gensalt_ra', crypt_header]]
have = cc.has_function(ident[0], prefix : ident[1], args : '-D_GNU_SOURCE',
dependencies : libcrypt)
conf.set10('HAVE_' + ident[0].to_upper(), have)
endforeach
libcap = dependency('libcap', required : false)
if not libcap.found()
# Compat with Ubuntu 14.04 which ships libcap w/o .pc file

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@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ static int write_root_shadow(const char *shadow_path, const char *hashed_passwor
static int process_root_args(void) {
_cleanup_close_ int lock = -1;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *_hashed_password = NULL;
struct crypt_data cd = {};
const char *password, *hashed_password;
const char *etc_passwd, *etc_shadow;
int r;
@ -866,13 +866,20 @@ static int process_root_args(void) {
password = "x";
hashed_password = arg_root_password;
} else if (arg_root_password) {
r = hash_password(arg_root_password, &_hashed_password);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to hash password: %m");
_cleanup_free_ char *salt = NULL;
/* hashed_password points inside cd after crypt_r returns so cd has function scope. */
password = "x";
hashed_password = _hashed_password;
r = make_salt(&salt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get salt: %m");
errno = 0;
hashed_password = crypt_r(arg_root_password, salt, &cd);
if (!hashed_password)
return log_error_errno(errno == 0 ? SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL) : errno,
"Failed to encrypt password: %m");
} else if (arg_delete_root_password)
password = hashed_password = "";
else

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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#include "dns-domain.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "home-util.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
@ -133,3 +134,35 @@ int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret) {
return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", formatted);
}
int test_password_one(const char *hashed_password, const char *password) {
struct crypt_data cc = {};
const char *k;
bool b;
errno = 0;
k = crypt_r(password, hashed_password, &cc);
if (!k) {
explicit_bzero_safe(&cc, sizeof(cc));
return errno_or_else(EINVAL);
}
b = streq(k, hashed_password);
explicit_bzero_safe(&cc, sizeof(cc));
return b;
}
int test_password_many(char **hashed_password, const char *password) {
char **hpw;
int r;
STRV_FOREACH(hpw, hashed_password) {
r = test_password_one(*hpw, password);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}

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@ -21,3 +21,6 @@ int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret);
/* Many of our operations might be slow due to crypto, fsck, recursive chown() and so on. For these
* operations permit a *very* long timeout */
#define HOME_SLOW_BUS_CALL_TIMEOUT_USEC (2*USEC_PER_MINUTE)
int test_password_one(const char *hashed_password, const char *password);
int test_password_many(char **hashed_password, const char *password);

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@ -70,23 +70,31 @@ static int add_fido2_salt(
size_t secret_size) {
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *l = NULL, *w = NULL, *e = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL, *hashed = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *unix_salt = NULL;
struct crypt_data cd = {};
char *k;
int r;
r = make_salt(&unix_salt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate salt: %m");
/* Before using UNIX hashing on the supplied key we base64 encode it, since crypt_r() and friends
* expect a NUL terminated string, and we use a binary key */
r = base64mem(secret, secret_size, &base64_encoded);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to base64 encode secret key: %m");
r = hash_password(base64_encoded, &hashed);
if (r < 0)
errno = 0;
k = crypt_r(base64_encoded, unix_salt, &cd);
if (!k)
return log_error_errno(errno_or_else(EINVAL), "Failed to UNIX hash secret key: %m");
r = json_build(&e, JSON_BUILD_OBJECT(
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("credential", JSON_BUILD_BASE64(cid, cid_size)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("salt", JSON_BUILD_BASE64(fido2_salt, fido2_salt_size)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("hashedPassword", JSON_BUILD_STRING(hashed))));
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("hashedPassword", JSON_BUILD_STRING(k))));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to build FIDO2 salt JSON key object: %m");

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@ -134,7 +134,10 @@ static int add_pkcs11_encrypted_key(
const void *decrypted_key, size_t decrypted_key_size) {
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *l = NULL, *w = NULL, *e = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL, *hashed = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *salt = NULL;
struct crypt_data cd = {};
char *k;
int r;
assert(v);
@ -144,20 +147,25 @@ static int add_pkcs11_encrypted_key(
assert(decrypted_key);
assert(decrypted_key_size > 0);
r = make_salt(&salt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate salt: %m");
/* Before using UNIX hashing on the supplied key we base64 encode it, since crypt_r() and friends
* expect a NUL terminated string, and we use a binary key */
r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to base64 encode secret key: %m");
r = hash_password(base64_encoded, &hashed);
if (r < 0)
errno = 0;
k = crypt_r(base64_encoded, salt, &cd);
if (!k)
return log_error_errno(errno_or_else(EINVAL), "Failed to UNIX hash secret key: %m");
r = json_build(&e, JSON_BUILD_OBJECT(
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("uri", JSON_BUILD_STRING(uri)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("data", JSON_BUILD_BASE64(encrypted_key, encrypted_key_size)),
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("hashedPassword", JSON_BUILD_STRING(hashed))));
JSON_BUILD_PAIR("hashedPassword", JSON_BUILD_STRING(k))));
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to build encrypted JSON key object: %m");

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@ -183,7 +183,9 @@ static int print_qr_code(const char *secret) {
}
int identity_add_recovery_key(JsonVariant **v) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *password = NULL, *hashed = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *unix_salt = NULL, *password = NULL;
struct crypt_data cd = {};
char *k;
int r;
assert(v);
@ -194,12 +196,17 @@ int identity_add_recovery_key(JsonVariant **v) {
return r;
/* Let's UNIX hash it */
r = hash_password(password, &hashed);
r = make_salt(&unix_salt);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate salt: %m");
errno = 0;
k = crypt_r(password, unix_salt, &cd);
if (!k)
return log_error_errno(errno_or_else(EINVAL), "Failed to UNIX hash secret key: %m");
/* Let's now add the "privileged" version of the recovery key */
r = add_privileged(v, hashed);
r = add_privileged(v, k);
if (r < 0)
return r;

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@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include "homework-mount.h"
#include "homework-pkcs11.h"
#include "homework.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "main-func.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "missing_magic.h"

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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#include "bus-common-errors.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "home-util.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "pwquality-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "user-record-pwquality.h"

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@ -806,13 +806,20 @@ int user_record_make_hashed_password(UserRecord *h, char **secret, bool extend)
}
STRV_FOREACH(i, secret) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *hashed = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *salt = NULL;
struct crypt_data cd = {};
char *k;
r = hash_password(*i, &hashed);
r = make_salt(&salt);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = strv_consume(&np, TAKE_PTR(hashed));
errno = 0;
k = crypt_r(*i, salt, &cd);
if (!k)
return errno_or_else(EINVAL);
r = strv_extend(&np, k);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}

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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ int stub_pid1(sd_id128_t uuid) {
assert_se(sigfillset(&fullmask) >= 0);
assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &fullmask, &oldmask) >= 0);
/* Surrender the terminal this stub may control so that child processes can have a controlling terminal
* without resorting to setsid hacks. */
r = ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCNOTTY);
if (r < 0 && errno != ENOTTY)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to surrender controlling terminal: %m");
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fork child pid: %m");
@ -60,10 +66,7 @@ int stub_pid1(sd_id128_t uuid) {
if (pid == 0) {
/* Return in the child */
assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL) >= 0);
if (setsid() < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to become session leader in payload process: %m");
setsid();
return 0;
}
@ -73,12 +76,6 @@ int stub_pid1(sd_id128_t uuid) {
(void) close_all_fds(NULL, 0);
log_open();
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCNOTTY) < 0) {
if (errno != ENOTTY)
log_warning_errno(errno, "Unexpected error from TIOCNOTTY ioctl in init stub process, ignoring: %m");
} else
log_warning("Expected TIOCNOTTY to fail, but it succeeded in init stub process, ignoring.");
/* Flush out /proc/self/environ, so that we don't leak the environment from the host into the container. Also,
* set $container= and $container_uuid= so that clients in the container that query it from /proc/1/environ
* find them set. */

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@ -11,12 +11,10 @@
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sd-bus.h"
@ -256,11 +254,10 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_sysctl, strv_freep);
static int handle_arg_console(const char *arg) {
if (streq(arg, "help")) {
puts("autopipe\n"
"interactive\n"
puts("interactive\n"
"read-only\n"
"passive\n"
"pipe\n"
"read-only");
"pipe");
return 0;
}
@ -270,20 +267,9 @@ static int handle_arg_console(const char *arg) {
arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_READ_ONLY;
else if (streq(arg, "passive"))
arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PASSIVE;
else if (streq(arg, "pipe")) {
if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) > 0 && isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) > 0)
log_full(arg_quiet ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_NOTICE,
"Console mode 'pipe' selected, but standard input/output are connected to an interactive TTY. "
"Most likely you want to use 'interactive' console mode for proper interactivity and shell job control. "
"Proceeding anyway.");
else if (streq(arg, "pipe"))
arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PIPE;
} else if (streq(arg, "autopipe")) {
if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) > 0 && isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) > 0)
arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_INTERACTIVE;
else
arg_console_mode = CONSOLE_PIPE;
} else
else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown console mode: %s", optarg);
arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_CONSOLE_MODE;
@ -2283,12 +2269,10 @@ static int setup_pts(const char *dest) {
}
static int setup_stdio_as_dev_console(void) {
_cleanup_close_ int terminal = -1;
int terminal;
int r;
/* We open the TTY in O_NOCTTY mode, so that we do not become controller yet. We'll do that later
* explicitly, if we are configured to. */
terminal = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
terminal = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_RDWR);
if (terminal < 0)
return log_error_errno(terminal, "Failed to open console: %m");
@ -2300,7 +2284,6 @@ static int setup_stdio_as_dev_console(void) {
/* invalidates 'terminal' on success and failure */
r = rearrange_stdio(terminal, terminal, terminal);
TAKE_FD(terminal);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to move console to stdin/stdout/stderr: %m");
@ -3383,7 +3366,8 @@ static int inner_child(
* wait until the parent is ready with the
* setup, too... */
if (!barrier_place_and_sync(barrier)) /* #5 */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "Parent died too early");
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH),
"Parent died too early");
if (arg_chdir)
if (chdir(arg_chdir) < 0)
@ -3395,13 +3379,6 @@ static int inner_child(
return r;
}
if (arg_console_mode != CONSOLE_PIPE) {
/* So far our pty wasn't controlled by any process. Finally, it's time to change that, if we
* are configured for that. Acquire it as controlling tty. */
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to acquire controlling TTY: %m");
}
log_debug("Inner child completed, invoking payload.");
/* Now, explicitly close the log, so that we then can close all remaining fds. Closing the log explicitly first

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@ -1,29 +1,12 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
/* libxcrypt is a replacement for glibc's libcrypt, and libcrypt might be
* removed from glibc at some point. As part of the removal, defines for
* crypt(3) are dropped from unistd.h, and we must include crypt.h instead.
*
* Newer versions of glibc (v2.0+) already ship crypt.h with a definition
* of crypt(3) as well, so we simply include it if it is present. MariaDB,
* MySQL, PostgreSQL, Perl and some other wide-spread packages do it the
* same way since ages without any problems.
*/
# include <crypt.h>
#else
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "missing_stdlib.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
@ -31,12 +14,12 @@
int make_salt(char **ret) {
#if HAVE_CRYPT_GENSALT_RA
#ifdef XCRYPT_VERSION_MAJOR
const char *e;
char *salt;
/* If we have crypt_gensalt_ra() we default to the "preferred method" (i.e. usually yescrypt).
* crypt_gensalt_ra() is usually provided by libxcrypt. */
/* If we have libxcrypt we default to the "preferred method" (i.e. usually yescrypt), and generate it
* with crypt_gensalt_ra(). */
e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_CRYPT_PREFIX");
if (!e)
@ -51,7 +34,8 @@ int make_salt(char **ret) {
*ret = salt;
return 0;
#else
/* If crypt_gensalt_ra() is not available, we use SHA512 and generate the salt on our own. */
/* If libxcrypt is not used, we use SHA512 and generate the salt on our own since crypt_gensalt_ra()
* is not available. */
static const char table[] =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
@ -69,8 +53,6 @@ int make_salt(char **ret) {
assert_cc(sizeof(table) == 64U + 1U);
log_debug("Generating fallback salt for hash prefix: $6$");
/* Insist on the best randomness by setting RANDOM_BLOCK, this is about keeping passwords secret after all. */
r = genuine_random_bytes(raw, sizeof(raw), RANDOM_BLOCK);
if (r < 0)
@ -92,73 +74,6 @@ int make_salt(char **ret) {
#endif
}
#if HAVE_CRYPT_RA
# define CRYPT_RA_NAME "crypt_ra"
#else
# define CRYPT_RA_NAME "crypt_r"
/* Provide a poor man's fallback that uses a fixed size buffer. */
static char* systemd_crypt_ra(const char *phrase, const char *setting, void **data, int *size) {
assert(data);
assert(size);
/* We allocate the buffer because crypt(3) says: struct crypt_data may be quite large (32kB in this
* implementation of libcrypt; over 128kB in some other implementations). This is large enough that
* it may be unwise to allocate it on the stack. */
if (!*data) {
*data = new0(struct crypt_data, 1);
if (!*data) {
errno = -ENOMEM;
return NULL;
}
*size = (int) (sizeof(struct crypt_data));
}
char *t = crypt_r(phrase, setting, *data);
if (!t)
return NULL;
/* crypt_r may return a pointer to an invalid hashed password on error. Our callers expect NULL on
* error, so let's just return that. */
if (t[0] == '*')
return NULL;
return t;
}
#define crypt_ra systemd_crypt_ra
#endif
int hash_password_full(const char *password, void **cd_data, int *cd_size, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *salt = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *_cd_data = NULL;
char *p;
int r, _cd_size = 0;
assert(!!cd_data == !!cd_size);
r = make_salt(&salt);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to generate salt: %m");
errno = 0;
p = crypt_ra(password, salt, cd_data ?: &_cd_data, cd_size ?: &_cd_size);
if (!p)
return log_debug_errno(errno_or_else(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL)),
CRYPT_RA_NAME "() failed: %m");
p = strdup(p);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
*ret = p;
return 0;
}
bool looks_like_hashed_password(const char *s) {
/* Returns false if the specified string is certainly not a hashed UNIX password. crypt(5) lists
* various hashing methods. We only reject (return false) strings which are documented to have
@ -174,35 +89,3 @@ bool looks_like_hashed_password(const char *s) {
return !STR_IN_SET(s, "x", "*");
}
int test_password_one(const char *hashed_password, const char *password) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *cd_data = NULL;
int cd_size = 0;
const char *k;
errno = 0;
k = crypt_ra(password, hashed_password, &cd_data, &cd_size);
if (!k) {
if (errno == ENOMEM)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Unknown or unavailable hashing method or string too short */
return 0;
}
return streq(k, hashed_password);
}
int test_password_many(char **hashed_password, const char *password) {
char **hpw;
int r;
STRV_FOREACH(hpw, hashed_password) {
r = test_password_one(*hpw, password);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}

View File

@ -1,13 +1,22 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#pragma once
#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
/* libxcrypt is a replacement for glibc's libcrypt, and libcrypt might be
* removed from glibc at some point. As part of the removal, defines for
* crypt(3) are dropped from unistd.h, and we must include crypt.h instead.
*
* Newer versions of glibc (v2.0+) already ship crypt.h with a definition
* of crypt(3) as well, so we simply include it if it is present. MariaDB,
* MySQL, PostgreSQL, Perl and some other wide-spread packages do it the
* same way since ages without any problems.
*/
#include <crypt.h>
#endif
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int make_salt(char **ret);
int hash_password_full(const char *password, void **cd_data, int *cd_size, char **ret);
static inline int hash_password(const char *password, char **ret) {
return hash_password_full(password, NULL, NULL, ret);
}
bool looks_like_hashed_password(const char *s);
int test_password_one(const char *hashed_password, const char *password);
int test_password_many(char **hashed_password, const char *password);

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@ -301,10 +301,6 @@ tests += [
[],
[]],
[['src/test/test-libcrypt-util.c'],
[],
[]],
[['src/test/test-offline-passwd.c',
'src/shared/offline-passwd.c',
'src/shared/offline-passwd.h'],

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@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
# include <crypt.h>
#else
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include "strv.h"
#include "tests.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
static int test_hash_password(void) {
log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
/* As a warmup exercise, check if we can hash passwords. */
bool have_sane_hash = false;
const char *hash;
FOREACH_STRING(hash,
"ew3bU1.hoKk4o",
"$1$gc5rWpTB$wK1aul1PyBn9AX1z93stk1",
"$2b$12$BlqcGkB/7BFvNMXKGxDea.5/8D6FTny.cbNcHW/tqcrcyo6ZJd8u2",
"$5$lGhDrcrao9zb5oIK$05KlOVG3ocknx/ThreqXE/gk.XzFFBMTksc4t2CPDUD",
"$6$c7wB/3GiRk0VHf7e$zXJ7hN0aLZapE.iO4mn/oHu6.prsXTUG/5k1AxpgR85ELolyAcaIGRgzfwJs3isTChMDBjnthZyaMCfCNxo9I.",
"$y$j9T$$9cKOWsAm4m97WiYk61lPPibZpy3oaGPIbsL4koRe/XD") {
int b;
b = test_password_one(hash, "ppp");
log_info("%s: %s", hash, yes_no(b));
#if defined(XCRYPT_VERSION_MAJOR)
/* xcrypt is supposed to always implement all methods. */
assert_se(b);
#endif
if (b && IN_SET(hash[1], '6', 'y'))
have_sane_hash = true;
}
return have_sane_hash;
}
static void test_hash_password_full(void) {
log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
_cleanup_free_ void *cd_data = NULL;
const char *i;
int cd_size = 0;
log_info("sizeof(struct crypt_data): %zu bytes", sizeof(struct crypt_data));
for (unsigned c = 0; c < 2; c++)
FOREACH_STRING(i, "abc123", "h⸿sło") {
_cleanup_free_ char *hashed;
if (c == 0)
assert_se(hash_password_full(i, &cd_data, &cd_size, &hashed) == 0);
else
assert_se(hash_password_full(i, NULL, NULL, &hashed) == 0);
log_debug("\"%s\"\"%s\"", i, hashed);
log_info("crypt_r[a] buffer size: %i bytes", cd_size);
assert_se(test_password_one(hashed, i) == true);
assert_se(test_password_one(i, hashed) <= 0); /* We get an error for non-utf8 */
assert_se(test_password_one(hashed, "foobar") == false);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE(hashed), i) == true);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE(hashed), "foobar") == false);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE(hashed, hashed, hashed), "foobar") == false);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE("$y$j9T$dlCXwkX0GC5L6B8Gf.4PN/$VCyEH",
hashed,
"$y$j9T$SAayASazWZIQeJd9AS02m/$"),
i) == true);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE("$W$j9T$dlCXwkX0GC5L6B8Gf.4PN/$VCyEH", /* no such method exists... */
hashed,
"$y$j9T$SAayASazWZIQeJd9AS02m/$"),
i) == true);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE("$y$j9T$dlCXwkX0GC5L6B8Gf.4PN/$VCyEH",
hashed,
"$y$j9T$SAayASazWZIQeJd9AS02m/$"),
"") == false);
assert_se(test_password_many(STRV_MAKE("$W$j9T$dlCXwkX0GC5L6B8Gf.4PN/$VCyEH", /* no such method exists... */
hashed,
"$y$j9T$SAayASazWZIQeJd9AS02m/$"),
"") == false);
}
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
test_setup_logging(LOG_DEBUG);
#if defined(__powerpc__) && !defined(XCRYPT_VERSION_MAJOR)
return log_tests_skipped("crypt_r() causes a buffer overflow on ppc64el, see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/16981#issuecomment-691203787");
#endif
if (!test_hash_password())
return log_tests_skipped("crypt doesn't support yescrypt or sha512crypt");
test_hash_password_full();
return 0;
}