man/systemd-detect-virt.xml

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
 
           <row>
             <entry><varname>powervm</varname></entry>
-            <entry>IBM PowerVM hypervisor — comes as firmware with some IBM POWER servers</entry>
+            <entry>IBM PowerVM hypervisor - comes as firmware with some IBM POWER servers</entry>
           </row>
 
           <row>

po/be.po

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 #
 #
 # Viktar Vaŭčkievič <victorenator@gmail.com>, 2015, 2016.
-# Zmicer Turok <nashtlumach@gmail.com>, 2020, 2021.
+# Zmicer Turok <nashtlumach@gmail.com>, 2020.
 msgid ""
 msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: systemd master\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2021-01-08 17:48+0100\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2021-01-10 18:36+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-10-16 06:30+0000\n"
 "Last-Translator: Zmicer Turok <nashtlumach@gmail.com>\n"
 "Language-Team: Belarusian <https://translate.fedoraproject.org/projects/"
 "systemd/master/be/>\n"
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
 "Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=n%10==1 && n%100!=11 ? 0 : n%10>=2 && n"
 "%10<=4 && (n%100<10 || n%100>=20) ? 1 : 2;\n"
-"X-Generator: Weblate 4.4\n"
+"X-Generator: Weblate 4.2.2\n"
 
 #: src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in:22
 msgid "Send passphrase back to system"
@@ -308,17 +308,22 @@ msgstr ""
 "ноўтбука, патрабуецца аўтэнтыфікацыя."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:117
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the power key"
 msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the reboot key"
-msgstr ""
-"Дазволіць праграмам перашкаджаць сістэме апрацоўваць кнопку перазапуску"
+msgstr "Дазволіць праграмам перашкаджаць сістэме апрацоўваць кнопку выключэння"
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:118
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid ""
+#| "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling "
+#| "of the power key."
 msgid ""
 "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling of "
 "the reboot key."
 msgstr ""
 "Для таго, каб дазволіць праграмам перашкаджаць сістэме апрацоўваць кнопку "
-"перазапуску, патрабуецца аўтэнтыфікацыя."
+"выключэння, патрабуецца аўтэнтыфікацыя."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:128
 msgid "Allow non-logged-in user to run programs"

po/fr.po

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: systemd\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2021-01-08 17:48+0100\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2021-01-14 06:37+0000\n"
-"Last-Translator: Julien Humbert <julroy67@gmail.com>\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2021-01-09 10:48+0000\n"
+"Last-Translator: Arnaud T. <listes.00@gmail.com>\n"
 "Language-Team: French <https://translate.fedoraproject.org/projects/systemd/"
 "master/fr/>\n"
 "Language: fr\n"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
 "Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=n > 1;\n"
-"X-Generator: Weblate 4.4.1\n"
+"X-Generator: Weblate 4.4\n"
 
 #: src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in:22
 msgid "Send passphrase back to system"
@@ -324,18 +324,24 @@ msgstr ""
 "gestion par le système du rabat de l’écran."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:117
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the power key"
 msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the reboot key"
 msgstr ""
-"Permet aux applications d’empêcher la gestion du bouton de redémarrage du "
+"Permet aux applications d’empêcher la gestion du bouton d’alimentation du "
 "système"
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:118
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid ""
+#| "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling "
+#| "of the power key."
 msgid ""
 "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling of "
 "the reboot key."
 msgstr ""
 "Authentification requise pour permettre à une application d’empêcher la "
-"gestion du bouton de redémarrage du système."
+"gestion du bouton d’alimentation du système."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:128
 msgid "Allow non-logged-in user to run programs"

po/ro.po

@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@
 # Romanian translation for systemd.
 # va511e <va511e@yahoo.com>, 2015.
 # Daniel Șerbănescu <daniel [at] serbanescu [dot] dk>, 2015, 2017.
-# Vlad <milovlad@outlook.com>, 2020, 2021.
+# Vlad <milovlad@outlook.com>, 2020.
 msgid ""
 msgstr ""
 "Project-Id-Version: systemd master\n"
 "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
 "POT-Creation-Date: 2021-01-08 17:48+0100\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2021-01-12 17:36+0000\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-12-26 08:36+0000\n"
 "Last-Translator: Vlad <milovlad@outlook.com>\n"
 "Language-Team: Romanian <https://translate.fedoraproject.org/projects/"
 "systemd/master/ro/>\n"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ msgstr ""
 "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
 "Plural-Forms: nplurals=3; plural=n==1 ? 0 : (n==0 || (n%100 > 0 && n%100 < "
 "20)) ? 1 : 2;\n"
-"X-Generator: Weblate 4.4\n"
+"X-Generator: Weblate 4.3.2\n"
 
 #: src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in:22
 msgid "Send passphrase back to system"
@@ -333,18 +333,24 @@ msgstr ""
 "comutatorului din capacul sistemului."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:117
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the power key"
 msgid "Allow applications to inhibit system handling of the reboot key"
 msgstr ""
-"Permite aplicațiilor să împiedice administrarea butonului de repornire a "
+"Permite aplicațiilor să împiedice administrarea butonului de pornire a "
 "sistemului"
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:118
+#, fuzzy
+#| msgid ""
+#| "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling "
+#| "of the power key."
 msgid ""
 "Authentication is required for an application to inhibit system handling of "
 "the reboot key."
 msgstr ""
 "Autentificarea este necesară pentru ca o aplicație să împiedice "
-"administrarea butonului de repornire a sistemului."
+"administrarea butonului de pornire a sistemului."
 
 #: src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy:128
 msgid "Allow non-logged-in user to run programs"

rules.d/50-udev-default.rules.in

@@ -85,11 +85,6 @@ KERNEL=="fuse", MODE="0666", OPTIONS+="static_node=fuse"
 # The static_node is required on s390x and ppc (they are using MODULE_ALIAS)
 KERNEL=="kvm", GROUP="kvm", MODE="@DEV_KVM_MODE@", OPTIONS+="static_node=kvm"
 
-KERNEL=="vsock", MODE="0666"
-KERNEL=="vhost-vsock", GROUP="kvm", MODE="@DEV_KVM_MODE@", OPTIONS+="static_node=vhost-vsock"
-
-KERNEL=="vhost-net", GROUP="kvm", MODE="@DEV_KVM_MODE@", OPTIONS+="static_node=vhost-net"
-
 KERNEL=="udmabuf", GROUP="kvm"
 
 SUBSYSTEM=="ptp", ATTR{clock_name}=="KVM virtual PTP", SYMLINK += "ptp_kvm"

src/basic/env-util.c

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
         "_"
 
 static bool env_name_is_valid_n(const char *e, size_t n) {
+        const char *p;
+
         if (!e)
                 return false;
 
@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ static bool env_name_is_valid_n(const char *e, size_t n) {
         if (n > (size_t) sysconf(_SC_ARG_MAX) - 2)
                 return false;
 
-        for (const char *p = e; p < e + n; p++)
+        for (p = e; p < e + n; p++)
                 if (!strchr(VALID_BASH_ENV_NAME_CHARS, *p))
                         return false;
 
@@ -187,14 +189,14 @@ static int env_append(char **r, char ***k, char **a) {
 
 char **strv_env_merge(size_t n_lists, ...) {
         _cleanup_strv_free_ char **ret = NULL;
-        size_t n = 0;
+        size_t n = 0, i;
         char **l, **k;
         va_list ap;
 
         /* Merges an arbitrary number of environment sets */
 
         va_start(ap, n_lists);
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n_lists; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < n_lists; i++) {
                 l = va_arg(ap, char**);
                 n += strv_length(l);
         }
@@ -208,7 +210,7 @@ char **strv_env_merge(size_t n_lists, ...) {
         k = ret;
 
         va_start(ap, n_lists);
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n_lists; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < n_lists; i++) {
                 l = va_arg(ap, char**);
                 if (env_append(ret, &k, l) < 0) {
                         va_end(ap);
@@ -274,8 +276,10 @@ char **strv_env_delete(char **x, size_t n_lists, ...) {
                 return NULL;
 
         STRV_FOREACH(k, x) {
+                size_t v;
+
                 va_start(ap, n_lists);
-                for (size_t v = 0; v < n_lists; v++) {
+                for (v = 0; v < n_lists; v++) {
                         char **l, **j;
 
                         l = va_arg(ap, char**);
@@ -306,6 +310,7 @@ char **strv_env_delete(char **x, size_t n_lists, ...) {
 }
 
 char **strv_env_unset(char **l, const char *p) {
+
         char **f, **t;
 
         if (!l)

src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c

@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ CustomMount* custom_mount_add(CustomMount **l, size_t *n, CustomMountType t) {
 }
 
 void custom_mount_free_all(CustomMount *l, size_t n) {
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        size_t i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
                 CustomMount *m = l + i;
 
                 free(m->source);
@@ -92,6 +94,7 @@ static bool source_path_is_valid(const char *p) {
 }
 
 static char *resolve_source_path(const char *dest, const char *source) {
+
         if (!source)
                 return NULL;
 
@@ -126,6 +129,7 @@ static int allocate_temporary_source(CustomMount *m) {
 }
 
 int custom_mount_prepare_all(const char *dest, CustomMount *l, size_t n) {
+        size_t i;
         int r;
 
         /* Prepare all custom mounts. This will make source we know all temporary directories. This is called in the
@@ -137,7 +141,7 @@ int custom_mount_prepare_all(const char *dest, CustomMount *l, size_t n) {
         /* Order the custom mounts, and make sure we have a working directory */
         typesafe_qsort(l, n, custom_mount_compare);
 
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
                 CustomMount *m = l + i;
 
                 /* /proc we mount in the inner child, i.e. when we acquired CLONE_NEWPID. All other mounts we mount
@@ -584,9 +588,10 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
         bool ro = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_APPLY_APIVFS_RO);
         bool in_userns = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_IN_USERNS);
         bool tmpfs_tmp = FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_APPLY_TMPFS_TMP);
+        size_t k;
         int r;
 
-        for (size_t k = 0; k < ELEMENTSOF(mount_table); k++) {
+        for (k = 0; k < ELEMENTSOF(mount_table); k++) {
                 _cleanup_free_ char *where = NULL, *options = NULL, *prefixed = NULL;
                 bool fatal = FLAGS_SET(mount_table[k].mount_settings, MOUNT_FATAL);
                 const char *o;
@@ -683,6 +688,7 @@ int mount_all(const char *dest,
 }
 
 static int parse_mount_bind_options(const char *options, unsigned long *mount_flags, char **mount_opts) {
+        const char *p = options;
         unsigned long flags = *mount_flags;
         char *opts = NULL;
         int r;
@@ -692,7 +698,7 @@ static int parse_mount_bind_options(const char *options, unsigned long *mount_fl
         for (;;) {
                 _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
 
-                r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", 0);
+                r = extract_first_word(&p, &word, ",", 0);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extract mount option: %m");
                 if (r == 0)
@@ -702,9 +708,11 @@ static int parse_mount_bind_options(const char *options, unsigned long *mount_fl
                         flags |= MS_REC;
                 else if (streq(word, "norbind"))
                         flags &= ~MS_REC;
-                else
+                else {
                         return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
-                                               "Invalid bind mount option: %s", word);
+                                               "Invalid bind mount option: %s",
+                                               word);
+                }
         }
 
         *mount_flags = flags;
@@ -781,6 +789,7 @@ static int mount_bind(const char *dest, CustomMount *m) {
 }
 
 static int mount_tmpfs(const char *dest, CustomMount *m, uid_t uid_shift, const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+
         const char *options;
         _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL, *where = NULL;
         int r;
@@ -918,11 +927,13 @@ int mount_custom(
                 uid_t uid_shift,
                 const char *selinux_apifs_context,
                 MountSettingsMask mount_settings) {
+
+        size_t i;
         int r;
 
         assert(dest);
 
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
                 CustomMount *m = mounts + i;
 
                 if (FLAGS_SET(mount_settings, MOUNT_IN_USERNS) != m->in_userns)
@@ -968,14 +979,20 @@ int mount_custom(
 }
 
 bool has_custom_root_mount(const CustomMount *mounts, size_t n) {
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
-                if (path_equal(mounts[i].destination, "/"))
+        size_t i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+                const CustomMount *m = mounts + i;
+
+                if (path_equal(m->destination, "/"))
                         return true;
+        }
 
         return false;
 }
 
 static int setup_volatile_state(const char *directory, uid_t uid_shift, const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+
         _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL;
         const char *p, *options;
         int r;
@@ -1004,6 +1021,7 @@ static int setup_volatile_state(const char *directory, uid_t uid_shift, const ch
 }
 
 static int setup_volatile_yes(const char *directory, uid_t uid_shift, const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+
         bool tmpfs_mounted = false, bind_mounted = false;
         char template[] = "/tmp/nspawn-volatile-XXXXXX";
         _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL, *bindir = NULL;
@@ -1091,6 +1109,7 @@ fail:
 }
 
 static int setup_volatile_overlay(const char *directory, uid_t uid_shift, const char *selinux_apifs_context) {
+
         _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL, *escaped_directory = NULL, *escaped_upper = NULL, *escaped_work = NULL;
         char template[] = "/tmp/nspawn-volatile-XXXXXX";
         const char *upper, *work, *options;

src/systemctl/systemctl-edit.c

@@ -398,14 +398,16 @@ static int find_paths_to_edit(sd_bus *bus, char **names, char ***paths) {
                         /* If loading of the unit failed server side complete, then the server won't tell us
                          * the unit file path. In that case, find the file client side. */
                         log_debug_errno(r, "Unit '%s' was not loaded correctly, retrying client-side.", *name);
-                        r = unit_find_paths(bus, *name, &lp, true, &cached_name_map, &cached_id_map, &path, &unit_paths);
+                        r = unit_find_paths(bus, *name, &lp, true, &cached_name_map, &cached_id_map, &path, NULL);
                 }
                 if (r == -ERFKILL)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Unit '%s' masked, cannot edit.", *name);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return r;
 
-                if (!path) {
+                if (r == 0) {
+                        assert(!path);
+
                         if (!arg_force) {
                                 log_info("Run 'systemctl edit%s --force --full %s' to create a new unit.",
                                          arg_scope == UNIT_FILE_GLOBAL ? " --global" :
@@ -420,6 +422,8 @@ static int find_paths_to_edit(sd_bus *bus, char **names, char ***paths) {
                                                  arg_full ? NULL : ".d/override.conf",
                                                  NULL, &new_path, &tmp_path);
                 } else {
+                        assert(path);
+
                         unit_name = basename(path);
                         /* We follow unit aliases, but we need to propagate the instance */
                         if (unit_name_is_valid(*name, UNIT_NAME_INSTANCE) &&

sysctl.d/50-coredump.conf.in

@@ -15,14 +15,15 @@
 # See systemd-coredump(8) and core(5).
 kernel.core_pattern=|@rootlibexecdir@/systemd-coredump %P %u %g %s %t %c %h
 
-# Allow 16 coredumps to be dispatched in parallel by the kernel.
-# We collect metadata from /proc/%P/, and thus need to make sure the crashed
-# processes are not reaped until we have finished collecting what we need. The
-# kernel default for this sysctl is "0" which means the kernel doesn't wait for
-# userspace to finish processing before reaping the crashed processes. With a
-# higher setting the kernel will delay reaping until we are done, but only for
-# the specified number of crashes in parallel. The value of 16 is chosen to
-# match systemd-coredump.socket's MaxConnections= value.
+# Allow that 16 coredumps are dispatched in parallel by the kernel. We want to
+# be able to collect process metadata from /proc/%P/ while processing
+# coredumps, and thus need to make sure the crashed processes are not reaped
+# until we finished collecting what we need. The kernel default for this sysctl
+# is "0" which means the kernel doesn't wait for userspace processes to finish
+# processing before reaping the crashed processes — by setting this higher the
+# kernel will delay reaping until we are done, but only for the specified
+# number of crashes in parallel. The value of 16 is chosen to match
+# systemd-coredump.socket's MaxConnections= value.
 kernel.core_pipe_limit=16
 
 # Also dump processes executing a set-user-ID/set-group-ID program that is

tmpfiles.d/static-nodes-permissions.conf.in

@@ -15,5 +15,3 @@ z /dev/loop-control 0660 - disk  -
 z /dev/net/tun      0666 - -     -
 z /dev/fuse         0666 - -     -
 z /dev/kvm          @DEV_KVM_MODE@ - kvm -
-z /dev/vhost-net    @DEV_KVM_MODE@ - kvm -
-z /dev/vhost-vsock  @DEV_KVM_MODE@ - kvm -