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15 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Lennart Poettering 03d52c9117
Merge 9391030e6e into bbec1c87d3 2024-11-26 11:51:51 -08:00
gerblesh bbec1c87d3 sysext: set SELinux context for hierarchies and workdir 2024-11-26 17:47:32 +00:00
Yu Watanabe f29a07f3fc man: several more assorted fixes
Continuation of 4ebbb5bfe8.
Closes #35307.
2024-11-26 17:28:14 +01:00
Luca Boccassi 0566bd9643
machine: increase timeouts in attempt to fix #35115 (#35117)
An attempt to fix https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/35115
2024-11-26 16:12:56 +00:00
Lennart Poettering 7b4b3a8f7b sd-varlink: fix bug when enqueuing messages with fds asynchronously
When determining the poll events to wait for we need to take the queue
of pending messages that carry fds into account. Otherwise we might end
up not waking up if such an fd-carrying message is enqueued
asynchronously (i.e. not from a dispatch callback).
2024-11-26 16:06:53 +00:00
Winterhuman 5bed97dd57
man/systemd-system.conf: Correct "struct" to "strict" (#35364) 2024-11-26 22:41:49 +09:00
Luca Boccassi c4d7a13c06 cryptsetup: convert pkcs11/fido2 to iovec for key handling
key-data might be NULL. Fixes crash:

0  0x0000559c62120530 in attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk (cd=0x559c6b192830, name=0x7ffd57981dc4 "root", token_type=TOKEN_FIDO2, key_file=0x0, key_data=0x0, passwords=0x0, flags=524296, until=0)
    at ../src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c:2234
        pass_volume_key = false
        r = 1469577760
        __func__ = '\000' <repeats 29 times>
1  0x0000559c6212279c in run (argc=6, argv=0x7ffd5797fe98) at ../src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c:2597
        discovered_key_data = {iov_base = 0x0, iov_len = 0}
        key_data = 0x0
        token_type = TOKEN_FIDO2
        destroy_key_file = 0x0
        flags = 524296
        until = 0
        passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE
        volume = 0x7ffd57981dc4 "root"
        source = 0x7ffd57981dc9 "/dev/disk/by-uuid/8372fb39-9ba4-461a-a618-07dcaae66280"
        status = CRYPT_INACTIVE
        tries = 0
        key_file = 0x0
        config = 0x7ffd57981e05 "luks,discard,fido2-device=auto,x-initrd.attach"
        use_cached_passphrase = true
        try_discover_key = true
        discovered_key_fn = 0x7ffd5797fa70 "root.key"
        passwords = 0x0
        cd = 0x559c6b192830
        verb = 0x7ffd57981dbd "attach"
        r = 0
        __func__ = "\000\000\000"
2  0x0000559c621231e6 in main (argc=6, argv=0x7ffd5797fe98) at ../src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c:2674
        r = 32553
        __func__ = "\000\000\000\000"

Follow-up for 53b6c99018
2024-11-26 22:04:24 +09:00
Abderrahim Kitouni 0ae6f4843e updatectl: fix DBus method signature for SetFeatureEnabled
The signature was changed to 'sit' in sysupdated during review, but updatectl
kept using 'sbt'
2024-11-26 22:03:41 +09:00
Yu Watanabe 1ea1a79aa1 Revert "Revert "man: use MIT-0 license for example codes in daemon(7)""
This reverts commit 7a9d0abe4d.
2024-11-26 12:26:10 +01:00
Luca Boccassi 7a9d0abe4d Revert "man: use MIT-0 license for example codes in daemon(7)"
This reverts commit 6046cc3660.
2024-11-26 19:47:21 +09:00
Yu Watanabe 6046cc3660 man: use MIT-0 license for example codes in daemon(7)
This page contains many short example codes. I do not think we should
add SPDX-License-Identifier for all codes.

Closes #35356.
2024-11-26 11:12:08 +01:00
Ivan Kruglov 3aa3f130c1 machine: add debug for systemd-nspawn@.service 2024-11-19 19:12:32 +01:00
Ivan Kruglov df18408ac6 machine: increase timeouts in attempt to fix #35115 2024-11-19 18:04:27 +01:00
Lennart Poettering 9391030e6e pretty-print: don't use OSC 8 for incompatible URLs 2024-11-19 10:55:51 +01:00
Lennart Poettering 302e8bbce3 string-util: split out EOT check in strip_tab_ansi()
Let's unify the eot check in one place in order to make things more
readable.
2024-11-19 10:55:51 +01:00
22 changed files with 170 additions and 72 deletions

View File

@ -684,6 +684,15 @@ fi</programlisting>
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>file-hierarchy</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>.</para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>
<title>Notes</title>
<para>
All example codes in this page are licensed under <literal>MIT No Attribution</literal>
(SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT-0).
</para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>
<title>See Also</title>
<para><simplelist type="inline">

View File

@ -128,7 +128,8 @@
<para>If <option>-keep-download=yes</option> is specified the image will be downloaded and stored in
a read-only subvolume/directory in the image directory that is named after the specified URL and its
HTTP etag. A writable snapshot is then taken from this subvolume, and named after the specified local
HTTP etag (see <ulink url="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_ETag">HTTP ETag</ulink> for more
information). A writable snapshot is then taken from this subvolume, and named after the specified local
name. This behavior ensures that creating multiple instances of the same URL is efficient, as
multiple downloads are not necessary. In order to create only the read-only image, and avoid creating
its writable snapshot, specify <literal>-</literal> as local name.</para>

View File

@ -28,7 +28,9 @@
<title>Description</title>
<para><command>pam_systemd_loadkey</command> reads a NUL-separated password list from the kernel keyring,
and sets the last password in the list as the PAM authtok.</para>
and sets the last password in the list as the PAM authtok, which can be used by e.g.
<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>pam_get_authtok</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
</para>
<para>The password list is supposed to be stored in the "user" keyring of the root user,
by an earlier call to

View File

@ -61,7 +61,10 @@
<literal>systemd-run0</literal> PAM stack.</para>
<para>Note that <command>run0</command> is implemented as an alternative multi-call invocation of
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-run</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>.</para>
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-run</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>. That is,
<command>run0</command> is a symbolic link to <command>systemd-run</command> executable file, and it
behaves as <command>run0</command> if it is invoked through the symbolic link, otherwise behaves as
<command>systemd-run</command>.</para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1>

View File

@ -41,8 +41,10 @@
<refsect1>
<title>Kernel Command Line</title>
<para><filename>systemd-rfkill</filename> understands the
following kernel command line parameter:</para>
<para>
<command>systemd-rfkill</command> understands the following kernel command line parameter. See also
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>kernel-command-line</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
</para>
<variablelist class='kernel-commandline-options'>
<varlistentry>

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@ -302,7 +302,7 @@
and running in an initrd equivalent to true, otherwise false. This implements a restricted subset of
the per-unit setting of the same name, see
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.exec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry> for
details: currently, the <literal>full</literal> or <literal>struct</literal> values are not
details: currently, the <literal>full</literal> or <literal>strict</literal> values are not
supported.</para>
<xi:include href="version-info.xml" xpointer="v256"/></listitem>

View File

@ -394,9 +394,9 @@
<listitem><para>SBAT metadata associated with the UKI or addon. SBAT policies are useful to revoke
whole groups of UKIs or addons with a single, static policy update that does not take space in
DBX/MOKX. If not specified manually, a default metadata entry consisting of
<literal>uki,1,UKI,uki,1,https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/</literal>
<programlisting>uki,1,UKI,uki,1,https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/unified_kernel_image/</programlisting>
for UKIs and
<literal>uki-addon,1,UKI Addon,addon,1,https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-stub.html</literal>
<programlisting>uki-addon,1,UKI Addon,addon,1,https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-stub.html</programlisting>
for addons will be used, to ensure it is always possible to revoke them. For more information on
SBAT see <ulink url="https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md">Shim documentation</ulink>.
</para>

View File

@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int write_string_file_full(
const char *fn,
const char *line,
WriteStringFileFlags flags,
const struct timespec *ts) {
const struct timespec *ts,
const char *label_fn) {
bool call_label_ops_post = false, made_file = false;
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL;
@ -321,7 +322,8 @@ int write_string_file_full(
mode_t mode = write_string_file_flags_to_mode(flags);
if (FLAGS_SET(flags, WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL|WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE)) {
r = label_ops_pre(dir_fd, fn, mode);
const char *lookup = label_fn ? label_fn : fn;
r = label_ops_pre(dir_fd, lookup, mode);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;

View File

@ -51,12 +51,13 @@ int write_string_stream_full(FILE *f, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags fla
static inline int write_string_stream(FILE *f, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
return write_string_stream_full(f, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
}
int write_string_file_full(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const struct timespec *ts);
int write_string_file_full(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const struct timespec *ts, const char *label_fn);
static inline int write_string_file(const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
return write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
return write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL, /*label_fn=*/ NULL);
}
static inline int write_string_file_at(int dir_fd, const char *fn, const char *line, WriteStringFileFlags flags) {
return write_string_file_full(dir_fd, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL);
return write_string_file_full(dir_fd, fn, line, flags, /* ts= */ NULL, /*label_fn=*/ NULL);
}
int write_string_filef(const char *fn, WriteStringFileFlags flags, const char *format, ...) _printf_(3, 4);

View File

@ -732,10 +732,12 @@ char* strip_tab_ansi(char **ibuf, size_t *_isz, size_t highlight[2]) {
for (const char *i = *ibuf; i < *ibuf + isz + 1; i++) {
bool eot = i >= *ibuf + isz;
switch (state) {
case STATE_OTHER:
if (i >= *ibuf + isz) /* EOT */
if (eot)
break;
if (*i == '\r') {
@ -760,7 +762,7 @@ char* strip_tab_ansi(char **ibuf, size_t *_isz, size_t highlight[2]) {
case STATE_ESCAPE:
assert(n_carriage_returns == 0);
if (i >= *ibuf + isz) { /* EOT */
if (eot) {
fputc('\x1B', f);
advance_offsets(i - *ibuf, highlight, shift, 1);
break;
@ -782,8 +784,7 @@ char* strip_tab_ansi(char **ibuf, size_t *_isz, size_t highlight[2]) {
case STATE_CSI:
assert(n_carriage_returns == 0);
if (i >= *ibuf + isz || /* EOT … */
!strchr("01234567890;m", *i)) { /* … or invalid chars in sequence */
if (eot || !strchr("01234567890;m", *i)) { /* EOT or invalid chars in sequence */
fputc('\x1B', f);
fputc('[', f);
advance_offsets(i - *ibuf, highlight, shift, 2);
@ -800,8 +801,7 @@ char* strip_tab_ansi(char **ibuf, size_t *_isz, size_t highlight[2]) {
/* There are three kinds of OSC terminators: \x07, \x1b\x5c or \x9c. We only support
* the first two, because the last one is a valid UTF-8 codepoint and hence creates
* an ambiguity (many Terminal emulators refuse to support it as well). */
if (i >= *ibuf + isz || /* EOT … */
(!IN_SET(*i, '\x07', '\x1b') && (uint8_t) *i < 32U) || (uint8_t) *i > 126U) { /* … or invalid chars in sequence */
if (eot || (!IN_SET(*i, '\x07', '\x1b') && !osc_char_is_valid(*i))) { /* EOT or invalid chars in sequence */
fputc('\x1B', f);
fputc(']', f);
advance_offsets(i - *ibuf, highlight, shift, 2);
@ -815,8 +815,7 @@ char* strip_tab_ansi(char **ibuf, size_t *_isz, size_t highlight[2]) {
break;
case STATE_OSC_CLOSING:
if (i >= *ibuf + isz || /* EOT … */
*i != '\x5c') { /* … or incomplete two-byte ST in sequence */
if (eot || *i != '\x5c') { /* EOT or incomplete two-byte ST in sequence */
fputc('\x1B', f);
fputc(']', f);
advance_offsets(i - *ibuf, highlight, shift, 2);

View File

@ -157,3 +157,9 @@ int terminal_is_pty_fd(int fd);
int pty_open_peer_racefree(int fd, int mode);
int pty_open_peer(int fd, int mode);
static inline bool osc_char_is_valid(char c) {
/* Checks whether the specified character is safe to be included inside an ANSI OSC sequence, as per
* ECMA-48 5th edition, section 8.3.89 */
return (unsigned char) c >= 32U && (unsigned char) c < 127;
}

View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "fileio.h"
#include "format-util.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "iovec-util.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
@ -31,8 +32,7 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
const char *key_file, /* We either expect key_file and associated parameters to be set (for file keys) … */
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data, /* … or key_data and key_data_size (for literal keys) */
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data, /* … or literal keys via key_data */
usec_t until,
AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
void **ret_decrypted_key,
@ -47,15 +47,15 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
assert(friendly_name);
assert(pkcs11_uri);
assert(key_file || key_data);
assert(key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data));
assert(ret_decrypted_key);
assert(ret_decrypted_key_size);
/* The functions called here log about all errors, except for EAGAIN which means "token not found right now" */
if (key_data) {
data.encrypted_key = (void*) key_data;
data.encrypted_key_size = key_data_size;
if (iovec_is_set(key_data)) {
data.encrypted_key = (void*) key_data->iov_base;
data.encrypted_key_size = key_data->iov_len;
data.free_encrypted_key = false;
} else {

View File

@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
void **ret_decrypted_key,
@ -39,8 +38,7 @@ static inline int decrypt_pkcs11_key(
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
AskPasswordFlags askpw_flags,
void **ret_decrypted_key,

View File

@ -1471,8 +1471,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
@ -1489,7 +1488,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
assert(name);
assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto);
if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !key_data)
if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing.");
@ -1513,7 +1512,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
arg_fido2_rp_id,
arg_fido2_cid, arg_fido2_cid_size,
key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
key_data, key_data_size,
key_data,
until,
arg_fido2_manual_flags,
"cryptsetup.fido2-pin",
@ -1623,8 +1622,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
const char *key_file,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
uint32_t flags,
bool pass_volume_key) {
@ -1635,6 +1633,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL;
struct iovec discovered_key_data = {};
int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
const char *uri = NULL;
bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins();
@ -1653,13 +1652,13 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
return r;
uri = discovered_uri;
key_data = discovered_key;
key_data_size = discovered_key_size;
discovered_key_data = IOVEC_MAKE(discovered_key, discovered_key_size);
key_data = &discovered_key_data;
}
} else {
uri = arg_pkcs11_uri;
if (!key_file && !key_data)
if (!key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
}
@ -1682,7 +1681,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
friendly,
uri,
key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
key_data, key_data_size,
key_data,
until,
arg_ask_password_flags,
&decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
@ -2231,9 +2230,9 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (key_data)
return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, flags, pass_volume_key);
if (key_file)

View File

@ -1698,7 +1698,8 @@ _public_ int sd_varlink_get_events(sd_varlink *v) {
ret |= EPOLLIN;
if (!v->write_disconnected &&
v->output_buffer_size > 0)
(v->output_queue ||
v->output_buffer_size > 0))
ret |= EPOLLOUT;
return ret;

View File

@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
Fido2EnrollFlags required,
const char *askpw_credential,
@ -45,10 +44,10 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
"Local verification is required to unlock this volume, but the 'headless' parameter was set.");
assert(cid);
assert(key_file || key_data);
assert(key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data));
if (key_data)
salt = IOVEC_MAKE(key_data, key_data_size);
if (iovec_is_set(key_data))
salt = *key_data;
else {
if (key_file_size > 0)
log_debug("Ignoring 'keyfile-size=' option for a FIDO2 salt file.");
@ -252,7 +251,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key_auto(
/* key_file= */ NULL, /* salt is read from LUKS header instead of key_file */
/* key_file_size= */ 0,
/* key_file_offset= */ 0,
salt, salt_size,
&IOVEC_MAKE(salt, salt_size),
until,
required,
"cryptsetup.fido2-pin",

View File

@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ int acquire_fido2_key(
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
Fido2EnrollFlags required,
const char *askpw_credential,
@ -52,8 +51,7 @@ static inline int acquire_fido2_key(
const char *key_file,
size_t key_file_size,
uint64_t key_file_offset,
const void *key_data,
size_t key_data_size,
const struct iovec *key_data,
usec_t until,
Fido2EnrollFlags required,
const char *askpw_credential,

View File

@ -76,6 +76,25 @@ bool urlify_enabled(void) {
#endif
}
static bool url_suitable_for_osc8(const char *url) {
assert(url);
/* Not all URLs are safe for inclusion in OSC 8 due to charset and length restrictions. Let's detect
* which ones those are */
/* If the URL is longer than 2K let's not try to do OSC 8. As per recommendation in
* https://gist.github.com/egmontkob/eb114294efbcd5adb1944c9f3cb5feda#length-limits */
if (strlen(url) > 2000)
return false;
/* OSC sequences may only contain chars from the 32..126 range, as per ECMA-48 */
for (const char *c = url; *c; c++)
if (!osc_char_is_valid(*c))
return false;
return true;
}
int terminal_urlify(const char *url, const char *text, char **ret) {
char *n;
@ -87,7 +106,7 @@ int terminal_urlify(const char *url, const char *text, char **ret) {
if (isempty(text))
text = url;
if (urlify_enabled())
if (urlify_enabled() && url_suitable_for_osc8(url))
n = strjoin(ANSI_OSC "8;;", url, ANSI_ST,
text,
ANSI_OSC "8;;" ANSI_ST);

View File

@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
@ -45,6 +46,7 @@
#include "process-util.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
#include "sort-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "terminal-util.h"
@ -899,6 +901,7 @@ static int resolve_mutable_directory(
_cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *resolved_path = NULL, *dir_name = NULL;
const char *root = arg_root, *base = MUTABLE_EXTENSIONS_BASE_DIR;
int r;
_cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
assert(hierarchy);
assert(ret_resolved_mutable_directory);
@ -943,6 +946,14 @@ static int resolve_mutable_directory(
r = mkdir_p(path_in_root, 0700);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create a directory '%s': %m", path_in_root);
atfd = open(path_in_root, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (atfd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", path_in_root);
r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, hierarchy, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", path_in_root);
}
r = chase(path, root, CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT, &resolved_path, NULL);
@ -1289,6 +1300,7 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
int r;
const char *top_layer = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
assert(op);
assert(overlay_path);
@ -1301,10 +1313,28 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make directory '%s': %m", meta_path);
atfd = open(meta_path, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (atfd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", meta_path);
r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, op->hierarchy, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", meta_path);
if (op->upper_dir && op->work_dir) {
r = mkdir_p(op->work_dir, 0700);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make directory '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
_cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF;
dfd = open(op->work_dir, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (dfd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
r = mac_selinux_fix_full(dfd, NULL, op->hierarchy, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", op->work_dir);
top_layer = op->upper_dir;
} else {
assert(!strv_isempty(op->lower_dirs));
@ -1325,7 +1355,7 @@ static int mount_overlayfs_with_op(
return 0;
}
static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, const char *meta_path) {
static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, const char *meta_path, const char *hierarchy) {
_cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL, *buf = NULL;
int r;
@ -1343,14 +1373,15 @@ static int write_extensions_file(ImageClass image_class, char **extensions, cons
if (!buf)
return log_oom();
r = write_string_file(f, buf, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_MKDIR_0755);
const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, image_class_info[image_class].short_identifier_plural);
r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD,f, buf, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_MKDIR_0755|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write extension meta file '%s': %m", f);
return 0;
}
static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *overlay_path) {
static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *overlay_path, const char *hierarchy) {
_cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
@ -1372,14 +1403,15 @@ static int write_dev_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const c
/* Modifying the underlying layers while the overlayfs is mounted is technically undefined, but at
* least it won't crash or deadlock, as per the kernel docs about overlayfs:
* https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/filesystems/overlayfs.html#changes-to-underlying-filesystems */
r = write_string_file(f, FORMAT_DEVNUM(st.st_dev), WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE);
const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, image_class_info[image_class].short_identifier_plural);
r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, f, FORMAT_DEVNUM(st.st_dev), WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write '%s': %m", f);
return 0;
}
static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *work_dir) {
static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, const char *work_dir, const char* hierarchy) {
_cleanup_free_ char *escaped_work_dir_in_root = NULL, *f = NULL;
char *work_dir_in_root = NULL;
int r;
@ -1406,7 +1438,8 @@ static int write_work_dir_file(ImageClass image_class, const char *meta_path, co
escaped_work_dir_in_root = cescape(work_dir_in_root);
if (!escaped_work_dir_in_root)
return log_oom();
r = write_string_file(f, escaped_work_dir_in_root, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE);
const char *hierarchy_path = path_join(hierarchy, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name, "work_dir");
r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, f, escaped_work_dir_in_root, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, NULL, hierarchy_path);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write '%s': %m", f);
@ -1418,8 +1451,10 @@ static int store_info_in_meta(
char **extensions,
const char *meta_path,
const char *overlay_path,
const char *work_dir) {
const char *work_dir,
const char *hierarchy) {
_cleanup_free_ char *f = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int atfd = -EBADF;
int r;
assert(extensions);
@ -1427,15 +1462,32 @@ static int store_info_in_meta(
assert(overlay_path);
/* work_dir may be NULL */
r = write_extensions_file(image_class, extensions, meta_path);
f = path_join(meta_path, image_class_info[image_class].dot_directory_name);
if (!f)
return log_oom();
r = mkdir_p(f, 0755);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = write_dev_file(image_class, meta_path, overlay_path);
atfd = open(f, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (atfd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open directory '%s': %m", f);
r = mac_selinux_fix_full(atfd, NULL, hierarchy, 0);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix SELinux label for '%s': %m", hierarchy);
r = write_extensions_file(image_class, extensions, meta_path, hierarchy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = write_work_dir_file(image_class, meta_path, work_dir);
r = write_dev_file(image_class, meta_path, overlay_path, hierarchy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = write_work_dir_file(image_class, meta_path, work_dir, hierarchy);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@ -1501,6 +1553,8 @@ static int merge_hierarchy(
assert(overlay_path);
assert(workspace_path);
mac_selinux_init();
r = determine_used_extensions(hierarchy, paths, &used_paths, &extensions_used);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@ -1528,7 +1582,7 @@ static int merge_hierarchy(
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = store_info_in_meta(image_class, extensions, meta_path, overlay_path, op->work_dir);
r = store_info_in_meta(image_class, extensions, meta_path, overlay_path, op->work_dir, op->hierarchy);
if (r < 0)
return r;

View File

@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ static int verb_enable(int argc, char **argv, void *userdata) {
"SetFeatureEnabled",
&error,
/* reply= */ NULL,
"sbt",
"sit",
*feature,
(int) enable,
UINT64_C(0));

View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static int apply_timestamp(const char *path, struct timespec *ts) {
timespec_load_nsec(ts)) < 0)
return log_oom();
r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, path, message, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, ts);
r = write_string_file_full(AT_FDCWD, path, message, WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_ATOMIC|WRITE_STRING_FILE_LABEL, ts, NULL);
if (r == -EROFS)
log_debug_errno(r, "Cannot create \"%s\", file system is read-only.", path);
else if (r < 0)

View File

@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ trap at_exit EXIT
systemctl service-log-level systemd-machined debug
systemctl service-log-level systemd-importd debug
# per request in https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/35117
systemctl edit --runtime --stdin 'systemd-nspawn@.service' --drop-in=debug.conf <<EOF
[Service]
Environment=SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug
EOF
# Mount temporary directory over /var/lib/machines to not pollute the image
mkdir -p /var/lib/machines
@ -278,13 +283,13 @@ varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.List
# sending TRAP signal
rm -f /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap
varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.Kill '{"name":"long-running", "whom": "leader", "signal": 5}'
timeout 30 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap; do sleep .5; done"
timeout 120 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/trap; do sleep .5; done"
# test io.systemd.Machine.Terminate
long_running_machine_start
rm -f /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate
varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.Terminate '{"name":"long-running"}'
timeout 10 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate; do sleep .5; done"
timeout 30 bash -c "until test -e /var/lib/machines/long-running/terminate; do sleep .5; done"
timeout 30 bash -c "while varlinkctl call /run/systemd/machine/io.systemd.Machine io.systemd.Machine.List '{\"name\":\"long-running\"}'; do sleep 0.5; done"
# test io.systemd.Machine.Register
@ -356,7 +361,7 @@ journalctl --sync
machinectl terminate container-without-os-release
machinectl terminate long-running
# wait for the container being stopped, otherwise acquiring image metadata by io.systemd.MachineImage.List may fail in the below.
timeout 10 bash -c "while machinectl status long-running &>/dev/null; do sleep .5; done"
timeout 30 bash -c "while machinectl status long-running &>/dev/null; do sleep .5; done"
systemctl kill --signal=KILL systemd-nspawn@long-running.service || :
(ip addr show lo | grep -q 192.168.1.100) || ip address add 192.168.1.100/24 dev lo