nspawn: Allow Capability= to overrule private network setting

The commit:

a3fc6b55ac nspawn: mask out CAP_NET_ADMIN again if settings file turns off private networking

turned off the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability whenever no private networking
feature was enabled. This broke configurations where the CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability was explicitly requested in the configuration.

Changing the order of evalution here to allow the Capability= setting
to overrule this implicit setting:

Order of evaluation:

1. if no private network setting is enabled, CAP_NET_ADMIN is removed
2. if a private network setting is enabled, CAP_NET_ADMIN is added
3. the settings of Capability= are added
4. the settings of DropCapability= are removed

This allows the fix for #11755 to be retained and to still allow the
admin to specify CAP_NET_ADMIN as additional capability.

Fixes: a3fc6b55ac
Fixes: #13995

man/systemd.network.xml

@@ -1701,7 +1701,7 @@
         <varlistentry>
           <term><varname>PrefixDelegationHint=</varname></term>
           <listitem>
-            <para>Takes an IPv6 address with prefix length as <varname>Addresss=</varname> in
+            <para>Takes an IPv6 address with prefix length as <varname>Address=</varname> in
             the "[Network]" section. Specifies the DHCPv6 client for the requesting router to include
             a prefix-hint in the DHCPv6 solicitation. Prefix ranges 1-128. Defaults to unset.</para>
           </listitem>

src/basic/missing_syscall.h

@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static inline int missing_renameat2(int oldfd, const char *oldname, int newfd, c
 
 #if !HAVE_KCMP
 static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2) {
-#  ifdef __NR_kcmp
+#  if defined __NR_kcmp && __NR_kcmp > 0
         return syscall(__NR_kcmp, pid1, pid2, type, idx1, idx2);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static inline int missing_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type, unsigned long i
 
 #if !HAVE_KEYCTL
 static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) {
-#  ifdef __NR_keyctl
+#  if defined __NR_keyctl && __NR_keyctl > 0
         return syscall(__NR_keyctl, cmd, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static inline long missing_keyctl(int cmd, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg
 }
 
 static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *description, const void *payload, size_t plen, key_serial_t ringid) {
-#  ifdef __NR_add_key
+#  if defined __NR_add_key && __NR_add_key > 0
         return syscall(__NR_add_key, type, description, payload, plen, ringid);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static inline key_serial_t missing_add_key(const char *type, const char *descrip
 }
 
 static inline key_serial_t missing_request_key(const char *type, const char *description, const char * callout_info, key_serial_t destringid) {
-#  ifdef __NR_request_key
+#  if defined __NR_request_key && __NR_request_key > 0
         return syscall(__NR_request_key, type, description, callout_info, destringid);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ enum {
 static inline long missing_set_mempolicy(int mode, const unsigned long *nodemask,
                            unsigned long maxnode) {
         long i;
-#  ifdef __NR_set_mempolicy
+#  if defined __NR_set_mempolicy && __NR_set_mempolicy > 0
         i = syscall(__NR_set_mempolicy, mode, nodemask, maxnode);
 #  else
         errno = ENOSYS;

src/nspawn/nspawn.c

@@ -3770,6 +3770,7 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
 
         if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_CAPABILITY) == 0) {
                 uint64_t plus, minus;
+                uint64_t network_minus = 0;
 
                 /* Note that we copy both the simple plus/minus caps here, and the full quintet from the
                  * Settings structure */
@@ -3781,14 +3782,16 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
                         if (settings_private_network(settings))
                                 plus |= UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN;
                         else
-                                minus |= UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN;
+                                network_minus |= UINT64_C(1) << CAP_NET_ADMIN;
                 }
 
                 if (!arg_settings_trusted && plus != 0) {
                         if (settings->capability != 0)
                                 log_warning("Ignoring Capability= setting, file %s is not trusted.", path);
-                } else
+                } else {
+                        arg_caps_retain &= ~network_minus;
                         arg_caps_retain |= plus;
+                }
 
                 arg_caps_retain &= ~minus;
 

src/shared/bus-util.c

@@ -411,7 +411,8 @@ int bus_verify_polkit_async(
                         e = sd_bus_message_get_error(q->reply);
 
                         /* Treat no PK available as access denied */
-                        if (sd_bus_error_has_name(e, SD_BUS_ERROR_SERVICE_UNKNOWN))
+                        if (sd_bus_error_has_name(e, SD_BUS_ERROR_SERVICE_UNKNOWN) ||
+                            sd_bus_error_has_name(e, SD_BUS_ERROR_NAME_HAS_NO_OWNER))
                                 return -EACCES;
 
                         /* Copy error from polkit reply */
@@ -422,7 +423,6 @@ int bus_verify_polkit_async(
                 r = sd_bus_message_enter_container(q->reply, 'r', "bba{ss}");
                 if (r >= 0)
                         r = sd_bus_message_read(q->reply, "bb", &authorized, &challenge);
-
                 if (r < 0)
                         return r;
 

src/test/test-seccomp.c

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
 #include "virt.h"
 
-#if SCMP_SYS(socket) < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
+/* __NR_socket may be invalid due to libseccomp */
+#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket <= 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
 /* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer,
  * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */
 #  define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1
@@ -304,14 +305,14 @@ static void test_protect_sysctl(void) {
         assert_se(pid >= 0);
 
         if (pid == 0) {
-#if __NR__sysctl > 0
+#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EFAULT);
 #endif
 
                 assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0);
 
-#if __NR__sysctl > 0
+#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0
                 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
                 assert_se(errno == EPERM);
 #endif
@@ -640,7 +641,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0
+#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
@@ -656,7 +657,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0
+#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
@@ -672,7 +673,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0
+#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
@@ -689,7 +690,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
                 s = hashmap_free(s);
 
                 assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
-#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0
+#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
 #else
                 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
@@ -767,8 +768,8 @@ static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) {
          * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On
          * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */
 
-#ifdef SYS_open
+#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open > 0
-        return (int) syscall(SYS_open, path, flags, mode);
+        return (int) syscall(__NR_open, path, flags, mode);
 #else
         return open(path, flags, mode);
 #endif