cryptenroll,cryptsetup,shutdown: only call mlockall if we have CAP_IPC_LOCK

Calling mlockall in an unprivileged process most notably had the effect
of making systemd-cryptenroll OOM while trying to open a normal-sized
argon2 keyslot due to it hitting RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.

src/basic/process-util.c

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <pthread.h>
 #include <spawn.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/personality.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "alloc-util.h"
 #include "architecture.h"
 #include "argv-util.h"
+#include "capability-util.h"
 #include "cgroup-util.h"
 #include "dirent-util.h"
 #include "dlfcn-util.h"
@@ -2227,6 +2229,26 @@ int proc_dir_read_pidref(DIR *d, PidRef *ret) {
         return 0;
 }
 
+int safe_mlockall(int flags) {
+        int r;
+
+        /* When dealing with sensitive data, let's lock ourselves into memory. We do this only when
+         * privileged however, as otherwise the amount of lockable memory that RLIMIT_MEMLOCK grants us is
+         * frequently too low to make this work. The resource limit has no effect on CAP_IPC_LOCK processes,
+         * hence that's the capability we check for. */
+        r = have_effective_cap(CAP_IPC_LOCK);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if we have CAP_IPC_LOCK: %m");
+        if (r == 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Lacking CAP_IPC_LOCK, skipping mlockall().");
+
+        if (mlockall(flags) < 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to call mlockall(): %m");
+
+        log_debug("Successfully called mlockall().");
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static const char *const sigchld_code_table[] = {
         [CLD_EXITED] = "exited",
         [CLD_KILLED] = "killed",

src/basic/process-util.h

@@ -257,5 +257,7 @@ int proc_dir_open(DIR **ret);
 int proc_dir_read(DIR *d, pid_t *ret);
 int proc_dir_read_pidref(DIR *d, PidRef *ret);
 
+int safe_mlockall(int flags);
+
 _noreturn_ void report_errno_and_exit(int errno_fd, int error);
 int read_errno(int errno_fd);

src/core/cgroup.c

@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ static void cgroup_apply_firewall(Unit *u) {
         (void) bpf_firewall_install(u);
 }
 
-void unit_modify_nft_set(Unit *u, bool add) {
+static void unit_modify_nft_set(Unit *u, bool add) {
         int r;
 
         assert(u);

src/core/cgroup.h

@@ -379,8 +379,6 @@ int cgroup_context_add_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, CGroupDev
 int cgroup_context_add_or_update_device_allow(CGroupContext *c, const char *dev, CGroupDevicePermissions p);
 int cgroup_context_add_bpf_foreign_program(CGroupContext *c, uint32_t attach_type, const char *path);
 
-void unit_modify_nft_set(Unit *u, bool add);
-
 CGroupMask unit_get_own_mask(Unit *u);
 CGroupMask unit_get_delegate_mask(Unit *u);
 CGroupMask unit_get_members_mask(Unit *u);

src/core/dbus-execute.c

@@ -1837,11 +1837,11 @@ static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode, exec_keyrin
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(protect_proc, ProtectProc, protect_proc_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(proc_subset, ProcSubset, proc_subset_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(private_bpf, PrivateBPF, private_bpf_from_string);
-static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(memory_thp, MemoryTHP, memory_thp_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE_PTR(bpf_delegate_commands, uint64_t, bpf_delegate_commands_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE_PTR(bpf_delegate_maps, uint64_t, bpf_delegate_maps_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE_PTR(bpf_delegate_programs, uint64_t, bpf_delegate_programs_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE_PTR(bpf_delegate_attachments, uint64_t, bpf_delegate_attachments_from_string);
+static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(memory_thp, MemoryTHP, memory_thp_from_string);
 BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, exec_preserve_mode_from_string);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_PARSE_PTR(personality, unsigned long, parse_personality);
 static BUS_DEFINE_SET_TRANSIENT_TO_STRING_ALLOC(secure_bits, "i", int32_t, int, "%" PRIi32, secure_bits_to_string_alloc_with_check);

src/core/exec-credential.c

@@ -310,50 +310,6 @@ int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_p
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int write_credential(
-                int dfd,
-                const char *id,
-                const void *data,
-                size_t size,
-                uid_t uid,
-                gid_t gid,
-                bool ownership_ok) {
-
-        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
-        int r;
-
-        assert(dfd >= 0);
-        assert(id);
-        assert(data || size == 0);
-
-        fd = openat(dfd, id, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
-        if (fd < 0)
-                return -errno;
-
-        r = loop_write(fd, data, size);
-        if (r < 0)
-                return r;
-
-        r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 0400)); /* Take away "w" bit */
-        if (r < 0)
-                return r;
-
-        if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) {
-                r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd, uid, ACL_READ);
-                /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want to express:
-                 * the user gets read access and nothing else. But if the backing fs can't
-                 * support that (e.g. ramfs), then we can use file ownership instead. But that's
-                 * only safe if we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the user
-                 * can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */
-                if ((ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) || ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) && ownership_ok)
-                        r = RET_NERRNO(fchown(fd, uid, gid));
-                if (r < 0)
-                        return r;
-        }
-
-        return 0;
-}
-
 typedef enum CredentialSearchPath {
         CREDENTIAL_SEARCH_PATH_TRUSTED,
         CREDENTIAL_SEARCH_PATH_ENCRYPTED,
@@ -430,6 +386,50 @@ struct load_cred_args {
         uint64_t left;
 };
 
+static int write_credential(
+                int dfd,
+                const char *id,
+                const void *data,
+                size_t size,
+                uid_t uid,
+                gid_t gid,
+                bool ownership_ok) {
+
+        _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(dfd >= 0);
+        assert(id);
+        assert(data || size == 0);
+
+        fd = openat(dfd, id, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
+        if (fd < 0)
+                return -errno;
+
+        r = loop_write(fd, data, size);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 0400)); /* Take away "w" bit */
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) {
+                r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd, uid, ACL_READ);
+                /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want to express:
+                 * the user gets read access and nothing else. But if the backing fs can't
+                 * support that (e.g. ramfs), then we can use file ownership instead. But that's
+                 * only safe if we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the user
+                 * can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */
+                if ((ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) || ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) && ownership_ok)
+                        r = RET_NERRNO(fchown(fd, uid, gid));
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int maybe_decrypt_and_write_credential(
                 struct load_cred_args *args,
                 const char *id,

src/core/exec-invoke.c

@@ -4752,6 +4752,33 @@ static int setup_delegated_namespaces(
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int set_memory_thp(MemoryTHP thp) {
+        int r;
+
+        switch (thp) {
+
+        case MEMORY_THP_INHERIT:
+                return 0;
+
+        case MEMORY_THP_DISABLE:
+                r = RET_NERRNO(prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+                break;
+
+        case MEMORY_THP_MADVISE:
+                r = RET_NERRNO(prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1, PR_THP_DISABLE_EXCEPT_ADVISED, 0, 0));
+                break;
+
+        case MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM:
+                r = RET_NERRNO(prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0));
+                break;
+
+        default:
+                assert_not_reached();
+        }
+
+        return r == -EINVAL ? -EOPNOTSUPP : r;
+}
+
 static bool exec_context_shall_confirm_spawn(const ExecContext *context) {
         assert(context);
 
@@ -4868,32 +4895,6 @@ static int exec_fd_mark_hot(
         return 1;
 }
 
-static int set_memory_thp(MemoryTHP thp) {
-        switch (thp) {
-
-        case MEMORY_THP_INHERIT:
-                return 0;
-
-        case MEMORY_THP_DISABLE:
-                if (prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
-                        return errno == EINVAL ? -EOPNOTSUPP : -errno;
-                return 0;
-
-        case MEMORY_THP_MADVISE:
-                if (prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1, PR_THP_DISABLE_EXCEPT_ADVISED, 0, 0) < 0)
-                        return errno == EINVAL ? -EOPNOTSUPP : -errno;
-                return 0;
-
-        case MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM:
-                if (prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
-                        return errno == EINVAL ? -EOPNOTSUPP : -errno;
-                return 0;
-
-        default:
-                assert_not_reached();
-        }
-}
-
 static int send_handoff_timestamp(
                 const ExecContext *c,
                 ExecParameters *p,
@@ -5580,7 +5581,7 @@ int exec_invoke(
 
         r = set_memory_thp(context->memory_thp);
         if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-                log_debug_errno(r, "Setting MemoryTHP=%s is not supported, ignoring: %m",
+                log_debug_errno(r, "Setting MemoryTHP=%s is not supported, ignoring.",
                                 memory_thp_to_string(context->memory_thp));
         else if (r < 0) {
                 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY_THP;

src/core/execute.c

@@ -1117,8 +1117,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 "%sProtectHostname: %s%s%s\n"
                 "%sProtectProc: %s\n"
                 "%sProcSubset: %s\n"
-                "%sPrivateBPF: %s\n"
-                "%sMemoryTHP: %s\n",
+                "%sMemoryTHP: %s\n"
+                "%sPrivateBPF: %s\n",
                 prefix, c->umask,
                 prefix, empty_to_root(c->working_directory),
                 prefix, empty_to_root(c->root_directory),
@@ -1146,8 +1146,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 prefix, protect_hostname_to_string(c->protect_hostname), c->private_hostname ? ":" : "", strempty(c->private_hostname),
                 prefix, protect_proc_to_string(c->protect_proc),
                 prefix, proc_subset_to_string(c->proc_subset),
-                prefix, private_bpf_to_string(c->private_bpf),
-                prefix, memory_thp_to_string(c->memory_thp));
+                prefix, memory_thp_to_string(c->memory_thp),
+                prefix, private_bpf_to_string(c->private_bpf));
 
         if (c->private_bpf == PRIVATE_BPF_YES) {
                 _cleanup_free_ char
@@ -3128,3 +3128,12 @@ static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = {
 };
 
 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode);
+
+static const char* const memory_thp_table[_MEMORY_THP_MAX] = {
+        [MEMORY_THP_INHERIT] = "inherit",
+        [MEMORY_THP_DISABLE] = "disable",
+        [MEMORY_THP_MADVISE] = "madvise",
+        [MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM]  = "system",
+};
+
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(memory_thp, MemoryTHP);

src/core/execute.h

@@ -73,6 +73,24 @@ typedef enum ExecKeyringMode {
         _EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
 } ExecKeyringMode;
 
+typedef enum MemoryTHP {
+        /*
+         * Inherit default from process that starts systemd, i.e. do not make
+         * any PR_SET_THP_DISABLE call.
+         */
+        MEMORY_THP_INHERIT,
+        MEMORY_THP_DISABLE, /* Disable THPs completely for the process */
+        MEMORY_THP_MADVISE, /* Disable THPs for the process except when madvised */
+        /*
+         * Use system default THP setting. this can be used when the process that
+         * starts systemd has already disabled THPs via PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, and we
+         * want to restore the system default THP setting at process invocation time.
+         */
+        MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM,
+        _MEMORY_THP_MAX,
+        _MEMORY_THP_INVALID = -EINVAL,
+} MemoryTHP;
+
 /* Contains start and exit information about an executed command.  */
 typedef struct ExecStatus {
         dual_timestamp start_timestamp;
@@ -600,9 +618,8 @@ bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType typ
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_FROM_STRING(exec_clean_mask, ExecCleanMask);
 
-DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);
-
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput);
+DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode);
 
@@ -611,11 +628,12 @@ DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode);
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode);
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_symlink, ExecDirectoryType);
-
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_mode, ExecDirectoryType);
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType);
 
+DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(memory_thp, MemoryTHP);
+
 bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *params, const ExecRuntime *runtime);
 bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context);
 bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context);

src/core/namespace.c

@@ -4039,15 +4039,6 @@ DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_map_type, uint64_t);
 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_prog_type, uint64_t);
 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_attach_type, uint64_t);
 
-static const char* const memory_thp_table[_MEMORY_THP_MAX] = {
-        [MEMORY_THP_INHERIT] = "inherit",
-        [MEMORY_THP_DISABLE] = "disable",
-        [MEMORY_THP_MADVISE] = "madvise",
-        [MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM]  = "system",
-};
-
-DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(memory_thp, MemoryTHP);
-
 char* bpf_delegate_to_string(uint64_t u, const char * (*parser)(uint64_t) _const_ ) {
         assert(parser);
 

src/core/namespace.h

@@ -90,24 +90,6 @@ typedef enum PrivatePIDs {
         _PRIVATE_PIDS_INVALID = -EINVAL,
 } PrivatePIDs;
 
-typedef enum MemoryTHP {
-        /*
-         * Inherit default from process that starts systemd, i.e. do not make
-         * any PR_SET_THP_DISABLE call.
-         */
-        MEMORY_THP_INHERIT,
-        MEMORY_THP_DISABLE, /* Disable THPs completely for the process */
-        MEMORY_THP_MADVISE, /* Disable THPs for the process except when madvised */
-        /*
-         * Use system default THP setting. this can be used when the process that
-         * starts systemd has already disabled THPs via PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, and we
-         * want to restore the system default THP setting at process invocation time.
-         */
-        MEMORY_THP_SYSTEM,
-        _MEMORY_THP_MAX,
-        _MEMORY_THP_INVALID = -EINVAL,
-} MemoryTHP;
-
 typedef struct BindMount {
         char *source;
         char *destination;
@@ -250,8 +232,6 @@ DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(private_bpf, PrivateBPF);
 
-DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(memory_thp, MemoryTHP);
-
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_cmd, uint64_t);
 
 DECLARE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(bpf_delegate_map_type, uint64_t);

src/core/unit.c

@@ -3801,7 +3801,6 @@ int unit_coldplug(Unit *u) {
         if (u->nop_job)
                 RET_GATHER(r, job_coldplug(u->nop_job));
 
-        unit_modify_nft_set(u, /* add= */ true);
         return r;
 }
 

src/core/varlink-execute.c

@@ -865,6 +865,9 @@ int unit_exec_context_build_json(sd_json_variant **ret, const char *name, void *
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CALLBACK("IOSchedulingClass", ioprio_class_build_json, c),
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_INTEGER("IOSchedulingPriority", ioprio_prio_data(exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(c))),
 
+                        JSON_BUILD_PAIR_TRISTATE_NON_NULL("MemoryKSM", c->memory_ksm),
+                        SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("MemoryTHP", memory_thp_to_string(c->memory_thp)),
+
                         /* Sandboxing */
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("ProtectSystem", protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system)),
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("ProtectHome", protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home)),
@@ -888,7 +891,6 @@ int unit_exec_context_build_json(sd_json_variant **ret, const char *name, void *
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING_NON_EMPTY("NetworkNamespacePath", c->network_namespace_path),
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_YES_NO("PrivateIPC", c->private_ipc),
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING_NON_EMPTY("IPCNamespacePath", c->ipc_namespace_path),
-                        JSON_BUILD_PAIR_TRISTATE_NON_NULL("MemoryKSM", c->memory_ksm),
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("PrivatePIDs", private_pids_to_string(c->private_pids)),
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("PrivateUsers", private_users_to_string(c->private_users)),
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING_NON_EMPTY("UserNamespacePath", c->user_namespace_path),
@@ -914,7 +916,6 @@ int unit_exec_context_build_json(sd_json_variant **ret, const char *name, void *
                         SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_BOOLEAN("RemoveIPC", c->remove_ipc),
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_TRISTATE_NON_NULL("PrivateMounts", c->private_mounts),
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING_NON_EMPTY("MountFlags", mount_propagation_flag_to_string(c->mount_propagation_flag)),
-                        SD_JSON_BUILD_PAIR_STRING("MemoryTHP", memory_thp_to_string(c->memory_thp)),
 
                         /* System Call Filtering */
                         JSON_BUILD_PAIR_CALLBACK_NON_NULL("SystemCallFilter", syscall_filter_build_json, c),

src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "parse-util.h"
 #include "pkcs11-util.h"
 #include "pretty-print.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
 #include "string-table.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
 #include "tpm2-pcr.h"
@@ -850,7 +851,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 return r;
 
         /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
-        (void) mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);
+        (void) safe_mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);
 
         cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL);
 

src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include "path-util.h"
 #include "pkcs11-util.h"
 #include "pretty-print.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
 #include "random-util.h"
 #include "string-table.h"
 #include "string-util.h"
@@ -2582,7 +2583,7 @@ static int verb_attach(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
                   volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));
 
         /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
-        (void) mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);
+        (void) safe_mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);
 
         if (key_file && arg_keyfile_erase)
                 destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */

src/include/uapi/linux/input-event-codes.h

@@ -891,6 +891,7 @@
 
 #define ABS_VOLUME		0x20
 #define ABS_PROFILE		0x21
+#define ABS_SND_PROFILE		0x22
 
 #define ABS_MISC		0x28
 
@@ -1000,4 +1001,12 @@
 #define SND_MAX			0x07
 #define SND_CNT			(SND_MAX+1)
 
+/*
+ * ABS_SND_PROFILE values
+ */
+
+#define SND_PROFILE_SILENT	0x00
+#define SND_PROFILE_VIBRATE	0x01
+#define SND_PROFILE_RING	0x02
+
 #endif

src/shared/bus-unit-util.c

@@ -2455,6 +2455,7 @@ static const BusProperty execute_properties[] = {
         { "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork",              bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
         { "LockPersonality",                       bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
         { "MemoryKSM",                             bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
+        { "MemoryTHP",                             bus_append_string                             },
         { "RestrictSUIDSGID",                      bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
         { "RootEphemeral",                         bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
         { "SetLoginEnvironment",                   bus_append_parse_boolean                      },
@@ -2494,7 +2495,6 @@ static const BusProperty execute_properties[] = {
         { "LogRateLimitBurst",                     bus_append_safe_atou                          },
         { "TTYRows",                               bus_append_safe_atou                          },
         { "TTYColumns",                            bus_append_safe_atou                          },
-        { "MemoryTHP",                             bus_append_string                             },
         { "MountFlags",                            bus_append_mount_propagation_flag_from_string },
         { "Environment",                           bus_append_strv_cunescape                     },
         { "UnsetEnvironment",                      bus_append_strv_cunescape                     },

src/shared/varlink-io.systemd.Unit.c

@@ -530,6 +530,11 @@ static SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_STRUCT_TYPE(
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#IOSchedulingPriority="),
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(IOSchedulingPriority, SD_VARLINK_INT, 0),
 
+                SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#MemoryKSM="),
+                SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(MemoryKSM, SD_VARLINK_BOOL, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
+                SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#MemoryTHP="),
+                SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(MemoryTHP, SD_VARLINK_STRING, 0),
+
                 /* Sandboxing
                  * https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd.exec.html#Sandboxing */
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#ProtectSystem="),
@@ -574,8 +579,6 @@ static SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_STRUCT_TYPE(
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(PrivateIPC, SD_VARLINK_STRING, 0),
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#IPCNamespacePath="),
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(IPCNamespacePath, SD_VARLINK_STRING, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
-                SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#MemoryKSM="),
-                SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(MemoryKSM, SD_VARLINK_BOOL, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#PrivatePIDs="),
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(PrivatePIDs, SD_VARLINK_STRING, 0),
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#PrivateUsers="),
@@ -626,8 +629,6 @@ static SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_STRUCT_TYPE(
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(PrivateMounts, SD_VARLINK_BOOL, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
                 SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#MountFlags="),
                 SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(MountFlags, SD_VARLINK_STRING, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
-                SD_VARLINK_FIELD_COMMENT("https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man"PROJECT_VERSION_STR"systemd.exec.html#MemoryTHP="),
-                SD_VARLINK_DEFINE_FIELD(MemoryTHP, SD_VARLINK_STRING, SD_VARLINK_NULLABLE),
 
                 /* System Call Filtering
                  * https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd.exec.html#System%20Call%20Filtering */

src/shutdown/shutdown.c

@@ -401,9 +401,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
         init_watchdog();
 
-        /* Lock us into memory */
-        (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT);
-        (void) mlockall(MCL_CURRENT);
+        /* Lock us into memory. If the first mlockall call fails, don't attempt it again. */
+        if (safe_mlockall(MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT) >= 0)
+                (void) mlockall(MCL_CURRENT);
 
         /* We need to make mounts private so that we can MS_MOVE in unmount_all(). Kernel does not allow
          * MS_MOVE when parent mountpoints have shared propagation. */