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8 changed files with 79 additions and 98 deletions

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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@a12a3943b4bdde767164f792f33f40b04645d846
- uses: systemd/mkosi@93098e2406e12ea7f06f962d4808952b8a06d345
- uses: systemd/mkosi@0dd39c20a4b3a2fab6efdc54da92bffad7c7b7ca
- name: Install
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends python3-pexpect python3-jinja2

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@ -441,10 +441,3 @@ SYSTEMD_HOME_DEBUG_SUFFIX=foo \
use for LUKS home directories, overriding the built-in default mount
options. There's one variable for each of the supported file systems for the
LUKS home directory backend.
`kernel-install`:
* `$KERNEL_INSTALL_BYPASS` If set to "1", execution of kernel-install is skipped
when kernel-install is invoked. This can be useful if kernel-install is invoked
unconditionally as a child process by another tool, such as package managers
running kernel-install in a postinstall script.

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@ -624,17 +624,6 @@ evdev:input:b0003v258Ap001E*
EVDEV_ABS_35=::15
EVDEV_ABS_36=::15
#########################################
# Positivo-Vaio
#########################################
# Vaio FE14
evdev:name:SYNA3602:00 0911:5288 Touchpad:dmi:*svnPositivoBahia-VAIO:pnVJFE41F11*
EVDEV_ABS_00=::28
EVDEV_ABS_01=::27
EVDEV_ABS_35=::28
EVDEV_ABS_36=::27
#########################################
# Razer
#########################################

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@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
<term><command>encrypt</command> <replaceable>input|-</replaceable> <replaceable>output|-</replaceable></term>
<listitem><para>Loads the specified (unencrypted plaintext) input credential file, encrypts it and
writes the (encrypted ciphertext) output to the specified target credential file. The resulting file
writes the (encrypted ciphertext) version to the specified output credential file. The resulting file
may be referenced in the <varname>LoadCredentialEncrypted=</varname> setting in unit files, or its
contents used literally in <varname>SetCredentialEncrypted=</varname> settings.</para>
@ -102,8 +102,8 @@
output path is specified as <literal>-</literal> the credential name cannot be derived from the file
system path, and thus should be specified explicitly via the <option>--name=</option> switch.</para>
<para>The credential data is encrypted and authenticated symmetrically with one of the following
encryption keys:</para>
<para>The credential data is encrypted symmetrically with one of the following encryption
keys:</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem><para>A secret key automatically derived from the system's TPM2 chip. This encryption key
@ -145,8 +145,8 @@
<optional><replaceable>output|-</replaceable></optional></term>
<listitem><para>Undoes the effect of the <command>encrypt</command> operation: loads the specified
(encrypted ciphertext) input credential file, decrypts and authenticates it and writes the (decrypted
plaintext) output to the specified target credential file.</para>
(encrypted ciphertext) input credential file, decrypts it and writes the (decrypted plaintext)
version to the specified output credential file.</para>
<para>Takes one or two file system paths. The file name part of the input path is compared with the
credential name embedded in the encrypted file. If it does not match decryption fails. This is done

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@ -3054,19 +3054,18 @@ StandardInputData=SWNrIHNpdHplIGRhIHVuJyBlc3NlIEtsb3BzLAp1ZmYgZWVtYWwga2xvcHAncy
loading from a directory, symlinks will be ignored.</para>
<para>The <varname>LoadCredentialEncrypted=</varname> setting is identical to
<varname>LoadCredential=</varname>, except that the credential data is decrypted and authenticated
before being passed on to the executed processes. Specifically, the referenced path should refer to a
file or socket with an encrypted credential, as implemented by
<varname>LoadCredential=</varname>, except that the credential data is decrypted before being passed
on to the executed processes. Specifically, the referenced path should refer to a file or socket with
an encrypted credential, as implemented by
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-creds</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>. This
credential is loaded, decrypted, authenticated and then passed to the application in plaintext form,
in the same way a regular credential specified via <varname>LoadCredential=</varname> would be. A
credential configured this way may be symmetrically encrypted/authenticated with a secret key derived
from the system's TPM2 security chip, or with a secret key stored in
<filename>/var/lib/systemd/credentials.secret</filename>, or with both. Using encrypted and
authenticated credentials improves security as credentials are not stored in plaintext and only
authenticated and decrypted into plaintext the moment a service requiring them is started. Moreover,
credentials may be bound to the local hardware and installations, so that they cannot easily be
analyzed offline, or be generated externally.</para>
credential is loaded, decrypted and then passed to the application in decrypted plaintext form, in
the same way a regular credential specified via <varname>LoadCredential=</varname> would be. A
credential configured this way may encrypted with a secret key derived from the system's TPM2
security chip, or with a secret key stored in
<filename>/var/lib/systemd/credentials.secret</filename>, or with both. Using encrypted credentials
improves security as credentials are not stored in plaintext and only decrypted into plaintext the
moment a service requiring them is started. Moreover, credentials may be bound to the local hardware
and installations, so that they cannot easily be analyzed offline.</para>
<para>The credential files/IPC sockets must be accessible to the service manager, but don't have to
be directly accessible to the unit's processes: the credential data is read and copied into separate,

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@ -1284,51 +1284,68 @@ static const sd_bus_vtable hostname_vtable[] = {
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("HardwareModel", "s", property_get_hardware_model, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("FirmwareVersion", "s", property_get_firmware_version, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetHostname",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", hostname, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetStaticHostname",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", hostname, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_static_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetPrettyHostname",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", hostname, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_pretty_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetIconName",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", icon, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_icon_name,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetChassis",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", chassis, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_chassis,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetDeployment",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", deployment, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_deployment,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("SetLocation",
SD_BUS_ARGS("s", location, "b", interactive),
SD_BUS_NO_RESULT,
method_set_location,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("GetProductUUID",
SD_BUS_ARGS("b", interactive),
SD_BUS_RESULT("ay", uuid),
method_get_product_uuid,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("GetHardwareSerial",
SD_BUS_NO_ARGS,
SD_BUS_RESULT("s", serial),
method_get_hardware_serial,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetHostname",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(hostname)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetStaticHostname",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(hostname)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_static_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetPrettyHostname",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(hostname)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_pretty_hostname,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetIconName",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(icon)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_icon_name,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetChassis",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(chassis)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_chassis,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetDeployment",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(deployment)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_deployment,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("SetLocation",
"sb",
SD_BUS_PARAM(location)
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
NULL,,
method_set_location,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("GetProductUUID",
"b",
SD_BUS_PARAM(interactive),
"ay",
SD_BUS_PARAM(uuid),
method_get_product_uuid,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_NAMES("GetHardwareSerial",
NULL,,
"s",
SD_BUS_PARAM(serial),
method_get_hardware_serial,
SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED),
SD_BUS_METHOD_WITH_ARGS("Describe",
SD_BUS_NO_ARGS,
SD_BUS_RESULT("s", json),

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@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ for i; do
fi
done
if [ "$KERNEL_INSTALL_BYPASS" = "1" ]; then
echo "kernel-install: Skipping execution because KERNEL_INSTALL_BYPASS=1"
exit 0
fi
export KERNEL_INSTALL_VERBOSE=0
if [ "$1" = "--verbose" ] || [ "$1" = "-v" ]; then
shift

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@ -55,18 +55,6 @@ else
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $UBSAN_FLAGS"
CXXFLAGS="$CXXFLAGS $UBSAN_FLAGS"
fi
if [[ "$SANITIZER" == introspector ]]; then
# fuzz-introspector passes -fuse-ld=gold and -flto using CFLAGS/LDFLAGS and due to
# https://github.com/mesonbuild/meson/issues/6377#issuecomment-575977919 and
# https://github.com/mesonbuild/meson/issues/6377 it doesn't mix well with meson.
# It's possible to build systemd with duct tape there using something like
# https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/pull/7583#issuecomment-1104011067 but
# apparently even with gold and lto some parts of systemd are missing from
# reports (presumably due to https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/issues/7598).
# Let's just fail here for now to make it clear that fuzz-introspector isn't supported.
exit 1
fi
fi
if ! meson "$build" "-D$fuzzflag" -Db_lundef=false; then