tree-wide: fix duplicated words

the the
in in
not not
we we

NEWS

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 251:
           image" environments, where the machine ID shall be initialized on
           first boot (as opposed to at installation time before first boot) the
           machine ID is not be available at build time to name the entry
-          after. In this case the the --entry-token= switch to bootctl (or the
+          after. In this case the --entry-token= switch to bootctl (or the
           /etc/kernel/entry-token file) may be used to override the "token" to
           identify the entry by, and use another ID, for example the IMAGE_ID=
           or ID= fields from /etc/os-release. This will make the OS images

src/basic/user-util.h

@@ -67,6 +67,19 @@ int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root);
 #define UID_NOBODY ((uid_t) 65534U)
 #define GID_NOBODY ((gid_t) 65534U)
 
+/* If REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT is set for remount_idmap() we'll include a mapping here that maps the host root
+ * user accessing the idmapped mount to the this user ID on the backing fs. This is the last valid UID in the
+ * *signed* 32bit range. You might wonder why precisely use this specific UID for this purpose? Well, we
+ * definitely cannot use the first 0…65536 UIDs for that, since in most cases that's precisely the file range
+ * we intend to map to some high UID range, and since UID mappings have to be bijective we thus cannot use
+ * them at all. Furthermore the UID range beyond INT32_MAX (i.e. the range above the signed 32bit range) is
+ * icky, since many APIs cannot use it (example: setfsuid() returns the old UID as signed integer). Following
+ * our usual logic of assigning a 16bit UID range to each container, so that the upper 16bit of a 32bit UID
+ * value indicate kind of a "container ID" and the lower 16bit map directly to the intended user you can read
+ * this specific UID as the "nobody" user of the container with ID 0x7FFF, which is kinda nice. */
+#define UID_MAPPED_ROOT ((uid_t) (INT32_MAX-1))
+#define GID_MAPPED_ROOT ((gid_t) (INT32_MAX-1))
+
 #define ETC_PASSWD_LOCK_PATH "/etc/.pwd.lock"
 
 /* The following macros add 1 when converting things, since UID 0 is a valid UID, while the pointer

src/boot/efi/measure.h

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 /* This TPM PCR is where we extend the kernel command line and any passed credentials here. */
 #define TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_PARAMETERS 12U
 
-/* We used to write the the kernel command line/credentials into PCR 8, in systemd <= 250. Let's provide for
+/* We used to write the kernel command line/credentials into PCR 8, in systemd <= 250. Let's provide for
  * some compatibility. (Remove in 2023!) */
 #if EFI_TPM_PCR_COMPAT
 #define TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_PARAMETERS_COMPAT 8U

src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c

@@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
                 /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
                  * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
                  * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
-                 * not not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
+                 * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
                  * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
                  * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
                  * via base64 encoding. */

src/home/homed-home.c

@@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ static int home_deactivate_internal(Home *h, bool force, sd_bus_error *error) {
         }
 
         /* Let's start a timer to retry deactivation in 15. We'll stop the timer once we manage to deactivate
-         * the home directory again, or we we start any other operation. */
+         * the home directory again, or we start any other operation. */
         home_start_retry_deactivate(h);
 
         return r;

src/home/homework-mount.c

@@ -216,6 +216,12 @@ static int make_userns(uid_t stored_uid, uid_t exposed_uid) {
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_oom();
 
+        /* Map nspawn's mapped root UID as identity mapping so that people can run nspawn uidmap mounted
+         * containers off $HOME, if they want. */
+        r = strextendf(&text, UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " " UID_FMT "\n", UID_MAPPED_ROOT, UID_MAPPED_ROOT, 1);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_oom();
+
         /* Leave everything else unmapped, starting from UID_NOBODY itself. Specifically, this means the
          * whole space outside of 16bit remains unmapped */
 

src/nspawn/nspawn-cgroup.c

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested)
          * the unified hierarchy and the container does the same, and we did not create a scope unit for the container
          * move us and the container into two separate subcgroups.
          *
-         * Moreover, container payloads such as systemd try to manage the cgroup they run in in full (i.e. including
+         * Moreover, container payloads such as systemd try to manage the cgroup they run in full (i.e. including
          * its attributes), while the host systemd will only delegate cgroups for children of the cgroup created for a
          * delegation unit, instead of the cgroup itself. This means, if we'd pass on the cgroup allocated from the
          * host systemd directly to the payload, the host and payload systemd might fight for the cgroup

src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c

@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int mount_bind(const char *dest, CustomMount *m, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t u
         }
 
         if (idmapped) {
-                r = remount_idmap(where, uid_shift, uid_range);
+                r = remount_idmap(where, uid_shift, uid_range, REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to map ids for bind mount %s: %m", where);
         }

src/nspawn/nspawn-oci.c

@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int oci_masked_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags
 
                 if (!path_is_absolute(p))
                         return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
-                                        "Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
+                                        "Path is not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
 
                 if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
                         continue;
@@ -2048,7 +2048,7 @@ static int oci_readonly_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlag
 
                 if (!path_is_absolute(p))
                         return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
-                                        "Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
+                                        "Path is not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
 
                 if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
                         continue;

src/nspawn/nspawn.c

@@ -3563,7 +3563,7 @@ static int inner_child(
 
 static int setup_notify_child(void) {
         _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
-        union sockaddr_union sa = {
+        static const union sockaddr_union sa = {
                 .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
                 .un.sun_path = NSPAWN_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH,
         };
@@ -3616,10 +3616,11 @@ static int outer_child(
         ssize_t l;
         int r;
 
-        /* This is the "outer" child process, i.e the one forked off by the container manager itself. It already has
-         * its own CLONE_NEWNS namespace (which was created by the clone()). It still lives in the host's CLONE_NEWPID,
-         * CLONE_NEWUTS, CLONE_NEWIPC, CLONE_NEWUSER and CLONE_NEWNET namespaces. After it completed a number of
-         * initializations a second child (the "inner" one) is forked off it, and it exits. */
+        /* This is the "outer" child process, i.e the one forked off by the container manager itself. It
+         * already has its own CLONE_NEWNS namespace (which was created by the clone()). It still lives in
+         * the host's CLONE_NEWPID, CLONE_NEWUTS, CLONE_NEWIPC, CLONE_NEWUSER and CLONE_NEWNET
+         * namespaces. After it completed a number of initializations a second child (the "inner" one) is
+         * forked off it, and it exits. */
 
         assert(barrier);
         assert(directory);
@@ -3649,10 +3650,10 @@ static int outer_child(
                 return r;
 
         if (dissected_image) {
-                /* If we are operating on a disk image, then mount its root directory now, but leave out the rest. We
-                 * can read the UID shift from it if we need to. Further down we'll mount the rest, but then with the
-                 * uid shift known. That way we can mount VFAT file systems shifted to the right place right away. This
-                 * makes sure ESP partitions and userns are compatible. */
+                /* If we are operating on a disk image, then mount its root directory now, but leave out the
+                 * rest. We can read the UID shift from it if we need to. Further down we'll mount the rest,
+                 * but then with the uid shift known. That way we can mount VFAT file systems shifted to the
+                 * right place right away. This makes sure ESP partitions and userns are compatible. */
 
                 r = dissected_image_mount_and_warn(
                                 dissected_image,
@@ -3682,9 +3683,9 @@ static int outer_child(
                                                "Short write while sending UID shift.");
 
                 if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK) {
-                        /* When we are supposed to pick the UID shift, the parent will check now whether the UID shift
-                         * we just read from the image is available. If yes, it will send the UID shift back to us, if
-                         * not it will pick a different one, and send it back to us. */
+                        /* When we are supposed to pick the UID shift, the parent will check now whether the
+                         * UID shift we just read from the image is available. If yes, it will send the UID
+                         * shift back to us, if not it will pick a different one, and send it back to us. */
 
                         l = recv(uid_shift_socket, &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), 0);
                         if (l < 0)
@@ -3740,7 +3741,8 @@ static int outer_child(
                 return r;
 
         if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO && bind_user_context) {
-                /* Send the user maps we determined to the parent, so that it installs it in our user namespace UID map table */
+                /* Send the user maps we determined to the parent, so that it installs it in our user
+                 * namespace UID map table */
 
                 for (size_t i = 0; i < bind_user_context->n_data; i++)  {
                         uid_t map[] = {
@@ -3779,7 +3781,7 @@ static int outer_child(
             IN_SET(arg_userns_ownership, USER_NAMESPACE_OWNERSHIP_MAP, USER_NAMESPACE_OWNERSHIP_AUTO) &&
             arg_uid_shift != 0) {
 
-                r = remount_idmap(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range);
+                r = remount_idmap(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT);
                 if (r == -EINVAL || ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) {
                         /* This might fail because the kernel or file system doesn't support idmapping. We
                          * can't really distinguish this nicely, nor do we have any guarantees about the
@@ -3833,15 +3835,13 @@ static int outer_child(
                 unified_cgroup_hierarchy_socket = safe_close(unified_cgroup_hierarchy_socket);
         }
 
-        /* Mark everything as shared so our mounts get propagated down. This is
-         * required to make new bind mounts available in systemd services
-         * inside the container that create a new mount namespace.
-         * See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3860
-         * Further submounts (such as /dev) done after this will inherit the
-         * shared propagation mode.
+        /* Mark everything as shared so our mounts get propagated down. This is required to make new bind
+         * mounts available in systemd services inside the container that create a new mount namespace.  See
+         * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3860 Further submounts (such as /dev) done after this
+         * will inherit the shared propagation mode.
          *
-         * IMPORTANT: Do not overmount the root directory anymore from now on to
-         * enable moving the root directory mount to root later on.
+         * IMPORTANT: Do not overmount the root directory anymore from now on to enable moving the root
+         * directory mount to root later on.
          * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3847#issuecomment-562735251
          */
         r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_ERR, NULL, directory, NULL, MS_SHARED|MS_REC, NULL);
@@ -5612,31 +5612,36 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 }
 
                 if (arg_start_mode == START_BOOT) {
+                        _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL;
                         const char *p;
 
-                        if (arg_pivot_root_new)
-                                p = prefix_roota(arg_directory, arg_pivot_root_new);
-                        else
+                        if (arg_pivot_root_new) {
+                                b = path_join(arg_directory, arg_pivot_root_new);
+                                if (!b)
+                                        return log_oom();
+
+                                p = b;
+                        } else
                                 p = arg_directory;
 
                         if (path_is_os_tree(p) <= 0) {
-                                log_error("Directory %s doesn't look like an OS root directory (os-release file is missing). Refusing.", p);
-                                r = -EINVAL;
+                                r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                                    "Directory %s doesn't look like an OS root directory (os-release file is missing). Refusing.", p);
                                 goto finish;
                         }
                 } else {
-                        const char *p, *q;
+                        _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
 
                         if (arg_pivot_root_new)
-                                p = prefix_roota(arg_directory, arg_pivot_root_new);
+                                p = path_join(arg_directory, arg_pivot_root_new, "/usr/");
                         else
-                                p = arg_directory;
+                                p = path_join(arg_directory, "/usr/");
+                        if (!p)
+                                return log_oom();
 
-                        q = strjoina(p, "/usr/");
-
-                        if (laccess(q, F_OK) < 0) {
-                                log_error("Directory %s doesn't look like it has an OS tree. Refusing.", p);
-                                r = -EINVAL;
+                        if (laccess(p, F_OK) < 0) {
+                                r = log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                                    "Directory %s doesn't look like it has an OS tree (/usr/ directory is missing). Refusing.", arg_directory);
                                 goto finish;
                         }
                 }

src/shared/base-filesystem.c

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int base_filesystem_create(const char *root, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
                         return -errno;
                 }
 
-                if (uid != UID_INVALID || gid != UID_INVALID)
+                if (uid_is_valid(uid) || gid_is_valid(gid))
                         if (fchownat(fd, table[i].dir, uid, gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0)
                                 return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to chown directory at %s/%s: %m", root, table[i].dir);
         }

src/shared/dissect-image.c

@@ -1807,7 +1807,7 @@ static int mount_partition(
                 (void) fs_grow(node, p);
 
         if (remap_uid_gid) {
-                r = remount_idmap(p, uid_shift, uid_range);
+                r = remount_idmap(p, uid_shift, uid_range, REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return r;
         }

src/shared/mount-util.c

@@ -1049,14 +1049,31 @@ int make_mount_point(const char *path) {
         return 1;
 }
 
-static int make_userns(uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range) {
-        char line[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t)*3+3+1];
+static int make_userns(uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, RemountIdmapFlags flags) {
         _cleanup_close_ int userns_fd = -1;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
 
         /* Allocates a userns file descriptor with the mapping we need. For this we'll fork off a child
          * process whose only purpose is to give us a new user namespace. It's killed when we got it. */
 
-        xsprintf(line, UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " " UID_FMT "\n", 0, uid_shift, uid_range);
+        if (asprintf(&line, UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " " UID_FMT "\n", 0, uid_shift, uid_range) < 0)
+                return log_oom_debug();
+
+        /* If requested we'll include an entry in the mapping so that the host root user can make changes to
+         * the uidmapped mount like it normally would. Specifically, we'll map the user with UID_HOST_ROOT on
+         * the backing fs to UID 0. This is useful, since nspawn code wants to create various missing inodes
+         * in the OS tree before booting into it, and this becomes very easy and straightforward to do if it
+         * can just do it under its own regular UID. Note that in that case the container's runtime uidmap
+         * (i.e. the one the container payload processes run in) will leave this UID unmapped, i.e. if we
+         * accidentally leave files owned by host root in the already uidmapped tree around they'll show up
+         * as owned by 'nobody', which is safe. (Of course, we shouldn't leave such inodes around, but always
+         * chown() them to the container's own UID range, but it's good to have a safety net, in case we
+         * forget it.) */
+        if (flags & REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT)
+                if (strextendf(&line,
+                               UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " " UID_FMT "\n",
+                               UID_MAPPED_ROOT, 0, 1) < 0)
+                        return log_oom_debug();
 
         /* We always assign the same UID and GID ranges */
         userns_fd = userns_acquire(line, line);
@@ -1069,7 +1086,8 @@ static int make_userns(uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range) {
 int remount_idmap(
                 const char *p,
                 uid_t uid_shift,
-                uid_t uid_range) {
+                uid_t uid_range,
+                RemountIdmapFlags flags) {
 
         _cleanup_close_ int mount_fd = -1, userns_fd = -1;
         int r;
@@ -1085,7 +1103,7 @@ int remount_idmap(
                 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open tree of mounted filesystem '%s': %m", p);
 
         /* Create a user namespace mapping */
-        userns_fd = make_userns(uid_shift, uid_range);
+        userns_fd = make_userns(uid_shift, uid_range, flags);
         if (userns_fd < 0)
                 return userns_fd;
 

src/shared/mount-util.h

@@ -112,7 +112,18 @@ int mount_image_in_namespace(pid_t target, const char *propagate_path, const cha
 
 int make_mount_point(const char *path);
 
-int remount_idmap(const char *p, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range);
+typedef enum RemountIdmapFlags {
+        /* Include a mapping from UID_MAPPED_ROOT (i.e. UID 2^31-2) on the backing fs to UID 0 on the
+         * uidmapped fs. This is useful to ensure that the host root user can safely add inodes to the
+         * uidmapped fs (which otherwise wouldn't work as the host root user is not defined on the uidmapped
+         * mount and any attempts to create inodes will then be refused with EOVERFLOW). The idea is that
+         * these inodes are quickly re-chown()ed to more suitable UIDs/GIDs. Any code that intends to be able
+         * to add inodes to file systems mapped this way should set this flag, but given it comes with
+         * certain security implications defaults to off, and requires explicit opt-in. */
+        REMOUNT_IDMAP_HOST_ROOT = 1 << 0,
+} RemountIdmapFlags;
+
+int remount_idmap(const char *p, uid_t uid_shift, uid_t uid_range, RemountIdmapFlags flags);
 
 /* Creates a mount point (not parents) based on the source path or stat - ie, a file or a directory */
 int make_mount_point_inode_from_stat(const struct stat *st, const char *dest, mode_t mode);

src/shared/netif-naming-scheme.c

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static const NamingScheme naming_schemes[] = {
 };
 
 const NamingScheme* naming_scheme_from_name(const char *name) {
-        /* "latest" may either be defined explicitly by the extra map, in which case we we will find it in
+        /* "latest" may either be defined explicitly by the extra map, in which case we will find it in
          * the table like any other name. After iterating through the table, we check for "latest" again,
          * which means that if not mapped explicitly, it maps to the last defined entry, whatever that is. */
 

src/udev/udev-ctrl.c

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 
 #include "alloc-util.h"
 #include "errno-util.h"
-#include "event-util.h"
 #include "fd-util.h"
 #include "format-util.h"
 #include "io-util.h"
@@ -106,13 +105,6 @@ static void udev_ctrl_disconnect(UdevCtrl *uctrl) {
         uctrl->sock_connect = safe_close(uctrl->sock_connect);
 }
 
-int udev_ctrl_is_connected(UdevCtrl *uctrl) {
-        if (!uctrl)
-                return false;
-
-        return event_source_is_enabled(uctrl->event_source_connect);
-}
-
 static UdevCtrl *udev_ctrl_free(UdevCtrl *uctrl) {
         assert(uctrl);
 
@@ -314,8 +306,6 @@ int udev_ctrl_send(UdevCtrl *uctrl, UdevCtrlMessageType type, const void *data)
                 strscpy(ctrl_msg_wire.value.buf, sizeof(ctrl_msg_wire.value.buf), data);
         } else if (IN_SET(type, UDEV_CTRL_SET_LOG_LEVEL, UDEV_CTRL_SET_CHILDREN_MAX))
                 ctrl_msg_wire.value.intval = PTR_TO_INT(data);
-        else if (type == UDEV_CTRL_SENDER_PID)
-                ctrl_msg_wire.value.pid = PTR_TO_PID(data);
 
         if (!uctrl->connected) {
                 if (connect(uctrl->sock, &uctrl->saddr.sa, uctrl->addrlen) < 0)

src/udev/udev-ctrl.h

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 #include "sd-event.h"
 
 #include "macro.h"
-#include "process-util.h"
 #include "time-util.h"
 
 typedef struct UdevCtrl UdevCtrl;
@@ -19,12 +18,10 @@ typedef enum UdevCtrlMessageType {
         UDEV_CTRL_SET_CHILDREN_MAX,
         UDEV_CTRL_PING,
         UDEV_CTRL_EXIT,
-        UDEV_CTRL_SENDER_PID,
 } UdevCtrlMessageType;
 
 typedef union UdevCtrlMessageValue {
         int intval;
-        pid_t pid;
         char buf[256];
 } UdevCtrlMessageValue;
 
@@ -42,7 +39,6 @@ UdevCtrl *udev_ctrl_unref(UdevCtrl *uctrl);
 int udev_ctrl_attach_event(UdevCtrl *uctrl, sd_event *event);
 int udev_ctrl_start(UdevCtrl *uctrl, udev_ctrl_handler_t callback, void *userdata);
 sd_event_source *udev_ctrl_get_event_source(UdevCtrl *uctrl);
-int udev_ctrl_is_connected(UdevCtrl *uctrl);
 
 int udev_ctrl_wait(UdevCtrl *uctrl, usec_t timeout);
 
@@ -79,8 +75,4 @@ static inline int udev_ctrl_send_exit(UdevCtrl *uctrl) {
         return udev_ctrl_send(uctrl, UDEV_CTRL_EXIT, NULL);
 }
 
-static inline int udev_ctrl_send_pid(UdevCtrl *uctrl) {
-        return udev_ctrl_send(uctrl, UDEV_CTRL_SENDER_PID, PID_TO_PTR(getpid_cached()));
-}
-
 DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(UdevCtrl*, udev_ctrl_unref);

src/udev/udevadm-control.c

@@ -87,11 +87,6 @@ int control_main(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to initialize udev control: %m");
 
-        /* See comments in on_post() in udevd.c. */
-        r = udev_ctrl_send_pid(uctrl);
-        if (r < 0)
-                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to send pid of this process: %m");
-
         while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "el:sSRp:m:t:Vh", options, NULL)) >= 0)
                 switch (c) {
                 case 'e':

src/udev/udevd.c

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include "sd-event.h"
 
 #include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "cgroup-setup.h"
 #include "cgroup-util.h"
 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
 #include "dev-setup.h"
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@
 #include "mkdir.h"
 #include "netlink-util.h"
 #include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
 #include "pretty-print.h"
 #include "proc-cmdline.h"
 #include "process-util.h"
@@ -85,7 +87,7 @@ typedef struct Manager {
         sd_event *event;
         Hashmap *workers;
         LIST_HEAD(Event, events);
-        const char *cgroup;
+        char *cgroup;
         pid_t pid; /* the process that originally allocated the manager object */
         int log_level;
 
@@ -108,8 +110,6 @@ typedef struct Manager {
 
         bool stop_exec_queue;
         bool exit;
-
-        pid_t pid_udevadm; /* pid of 'udevadm control' */
 } Manager;
 
 typedef enum EventState {
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ static Manager* manager_free(Manager *manager) {
         safe_close(manager->inotify_fd);
         safe_close_pair(manager->worker_watch);
 
+        free(manager->cgroup);
         return mfree(manager);
 }
 
@@ -496,7 +497,7 @@ static int worker_process_device(Manager *manager, sd_device *dev) {
                  * supposed to be enabled via an option set via udev rules (OPTIONS+="watch"). If we skip the
                  * udev rules here however (as we just said we do), we would thus never see that specific
                  * udev rule, and thus never turn on inotify watching. But in order to catch up eventually
-                 * and run them we we need the inotify watching: hence a classic chicken and egg problem.
+                 * and run them we need the inotify watching: hence a classic chicken and egg problem.
                  *
                  * Our way out here: if we see the block device locked, unconditionally watch the device via
                  * inotify, regardless of any explicit request via OPTIONS+="watch". Thus, a device that is
@@ -1217,10 +1218,6 @@ static int on_ctrl_msg(UdevCtrl *uctrl, UdevCtrlMessageType type, const UdevCtrl
                 log_debug("Received udev control message (EXIT)");
                 manager_exit(manager);
                 break;
-        case UDEV_CTRL_SENDER_PID:
-                log_debug("Received udev control message (SENDER_PID)");
-                manager->pid_udevadm = value->pid;
-                break;
         default:
                 log_debug("Received unknown udev control message, ignoring");
         }
@@ -1496,35 +1493,9 @@ static int on_post(sd_event_source *s, void *userdata) {
         if (manager->exit)
                 return sd_event_exit(manager->event, 0);
 
-        if (!manager->cgroup)
-                return 1;
-
-        /* Cleanup possible left-over processes in our cgroup. But do not kill udevadm called by
-         * ExecReload= in systemd-udevd.service. See #16867. To protect it, the following two ways are
-         * introduced:
-         *
-         * 1. After the connection is accepted, but the PID of udevadm is not received, do not call
-         *    cg_kill(). So, in this period, unwanted process or threads may exist in our cgroup.
-         *    But, it is expected that the PID of the udevadm will be received soon. So, this time
-         *    period should be short enough.
-         * 2. After the PID of udevadm is received, check the process is active or not, and if it is
-         *    still active, set the PID to the deny list for cg_kill(). Why udev_ctrl_is_connected() is
-         *    not enough? Because the udevadm may be still active after the control socket is
-         *    disconnected. If the process is not active, then clear the PID for later connections.
-         */
-
-        if (udev_ctrl_is_connected(manager->ctrl) >= 0 && !pid_is_valid(manager->pid_udevadm))
-                return 1;
-
-        _cleanup_set_free_ Set *pids = NULL;
-        if (pid_is_valid(manager->pid_udevadm)) {
-                if (pid_is_alive(manager->pid_udevadm))
-                        (void) set_ensure_put(&pids, NULL, PID_TO_PTR(manager->pid_udevadm));
-                else
-                        manager->pid_udevadm = 0;
-        }
-
-        (void) cg_kill(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, manager->cgroup, SIGKILL, CGROUP_IGNORE_SELF, pids, NULL, NULL);
+        if (manager->cgroup)
+                /* cleanup possible left-over processes in our cgroup */
+                (void) cg_kill(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, manager->cgroup, SIGKILL, CGROUP_IGNORE_SELF, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 
         return 1;
 }
@@ -1754,12 +1725,63 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         return 1;
 }
 
-static int manager_new(Manager **ret, int fd_ctrl, int fd_uevent, const char *cgroup) {
+static int create_subcgroup(char **ret) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *cgroup = NULL, *subcgroup = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        if (getppid() != 1)
+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Not invoked by PID1.");
+
+        r = sd_booted();
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check if systemd is running: %m");
+        if (r == 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "systemd is not running.");
+
+        /* Get our own cgroup, we regularly kill everything udev has left behind.
+         * We only do this on systemd systems, and only if we are directly spawned
+         * by PID1. Otherwise we are not guaranteed to have a dedicated cgroup. */
+
+        r = cg_pid_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, 0, &cgroup);
+        if (r < 0) {
+                if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -ENOMEDIUM))
+                        return log_debug_errno(r, "Dedicated cgroup not found: %m");
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to get cgroup: %m");
+        }
+
+        r = cg_get_xattr_bool(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, cgroup, "trusted.delegate");
+        if (IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA))
+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "The cgroup %s is not delegated to us.", cgroup);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read trusted.delegate attribute: %m");
+
+        /* We are invoked with our own delegated cgroup tree, let's move us one level down, so that we
+         * don't collide with the "no processes in inner nodes" rule of cgroups, when the service
+         * manager invokes the ExecReload= job in the .control/ subcgroup. */
+
+        subcgroup = path_join(cgroup, "/udev");
+        if (!subcgroup)
+                return log_oom_debug();
+
+        r = cg_create_and_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup, 0);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create %s subcgroup: %m", subcgroup);
+
+        log_debug("Created %s subcgroup.", subcgroup);
+        if (ret)
+                *ret = TAKE_PTR(subcgroup);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int manager_new(Manager **ret, int fd_ctrl, int fd_uevent) {
         _cleanup_(manager_freep) Manager *manager = NULL;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *cgroup = NULL;
         int r;
 
         assert(ret);
 
+        (void) create_subcgroup(&cgroup);
+
         manager = new(Manager, 1);
         if (!manager)
                 return log_oom();
@@ -1767,7 +1789,7 @@ static int manager_new(Manager **ret, int fd_ctrl, int fd_uevent, const char *cg
         *manager = (Manager) {
                 .inotify_fd = -1,
                 .worker_watch = { -1, -1 },
-                .cgroup = cgroup,
+                .cgroup = TAKE_PTR(cgroup),
         };
 
         r = udev_ctrl_new_from_fd(&manager->ctrl, fd_ctrl);
@@ -1912,7 +1934,6 @@ static int main_loop(Manager *manager) {
 }
 
 int run_udevd(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-        _cleanup_free_ char *cgroup = NULL;
         _cleanup_(manager_freep) Manager *manager = NULL;
         int fd_ctrl = -1, fd_uevent = -1;
         int r;
@@ -1969,24 +1990,11 @@ int run_udevd(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create /run/udev: %m");
 
-        if (getppid() == 1 && sd_booted() > 0) {
-                /* Get our own cgroup, we regularly kill everything udev has left behind.
-                 * We only do this on systemd systems, and only if we are directly spawned
-                 * by PID1. Otherwise we are not guaranteed to have a dedicated cgroup. */
-                r = cg_pid_get_path(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, 0, &cgroup);
-                if (r < 0) {
-                        if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -ENOMEDIUM))
-                                log_debug_errno(r, "Dedicated cgroup not found: %m");
-                        else
-                                log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to get cgroup: %m");
-                }
-        }
-
         r = listen_fds(&fd_ctrl, &fd_uevent);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to listen on fds: %m");
 
-        r = manager_new(&manager, fd_ctrl, fd_uevent, cgroup);
+        r = manager_new(&manager, fd_ctrl, fd_uevent);
         if (r < 0)
                 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create manager: %m");
 

test/networkd-test.py

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class NetworkdTestingUtilities:
 
     def read_attr(self, link, attribute):
         """Read a link attributed from the sysfs."""
-        # Note we we don't want to check if interface `link' is managed, we
+        # Note we don't want to check if interface `link' is managed, we
         # want to evaluate link variable and pass the value of the link to
         # assert_link_states e.g. eth0=managed.
         self.assert_link_states(**{link:'managed'})

units/systemd-udevd.service.in

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Before=sysinit.target
 ConditionPathIsReadWrite=/sys
 
 [Service]
+Delegate=pids
 DeviceAllow=block-* rwm
 DeviceAllow=char-* rwm
 Type=notify